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ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: A NORMATIVE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PHARMACIST
CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION
Joanna K. Sax*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the year is 2050 and an older gentleman with Parkinson’s disease
hobbles up to the pharmacy counter to fill a prescription for a new drug that will
help treat his ailment. The pharmacist refuses to fill the prescription because the
drug was developed through the use of embryonic stem cell research. The
pharmacist states that it violates his personal beliefs to fill prescriptions that are
based on this immoral type of research. The next person in line attempts to fill a
prescription for HIV medication. Again, the pharmacist refuses to fill the
prescription because he thinks that the HIV positive person may have contracted
the disease in a homosexual encounter and believes this type of behavior is
immoral.1 The next woman in line attempts to fill her prescription for birth control.
The pharmacist refuses and states that he is personally opposed to contraception.2
Indeed, the last of these scenarios repeatedly occurred in the 1990s and 2000s and
it is only a matter of time before the first two scenarios come to fruition.3 The
failure to fill medical prescriptions may lead to serious medical harms.
The issue is whether it is optimal for society to support legislation that allows a
pharmacist to escape liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription based on the
pharmacist’s personal beliefs, otherwise known as conscience clauses. Currently,
at least five states have pharmacist conscience clause legislation and many more
states are considering such legislation. This issue is particularly ripe as embryonic
stem cell research progresses because this research is engulfed by many of the
same controversies surrounding contraception. As stem cell research progresses,
many hope it will lead to the discovery and development of new drugs for a variety
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. B.S., 1997, University of
Wisconsin; Ph.D, 2003, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine; J.D., 2006, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. The Author wishes to thank Theodore Ruger, Edward Dauer, Robert Bohrer,
John Noyes, and Jeff Schwartz for their invaluable comments and criticisms. This Article, or portions
thereof, were presented at the 2009-2010 Biomedical Ethics Seminar Series, University of California
San Diego School of Medicine; California Western School of Law Research Workshop;
Southwest/West Junior Faculty Conference, Arizona State University O’Connor College of Law; and
the Law & Society 2010 Annual Meeting. The Author wishes to thank the participants at these
presentations and conferences for their invaluable insight and input.
1. Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to
Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2010 (2004)
(discussing the potential for discrimination against persons with HIV).
2. Joan Bray, Birth Control Is a Woman’s Decision, Not Her Pharmacist’s. Some Refuse To
Honor Legal Prescriptions on Moral Grounds. We Must Remind Them That’s Not Their Job., ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 2005, at B7 (stating that “pharmacists in this country increasingly are
refusing, based on personal moral objections, to fill women’s lawful prescriptions for birth control”).
3. See, e.g., Noesen v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Regulation & Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd.,
751 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
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of diseases. It is likely that pharmacists who object to filling prescriptions for
contraception will also refuse to fill prescriptions for drugs developed through stem
cell research. Legal scholarship in this area focuses on applying notions of fairness
to support or oppose pharmacist conscience clause legislation; however, this
fairness-based approach appears to be at an impasse. This Article proposes the
application of welfare economics to analyze whether conscience clauses maximize
social welfare.
Over the past several years, many states introduced legislation that protects a
pharmacist’s decision to refuse to fill a prescription.4 Termed “conscience
clauses,” these pieces of legislation allow a pharmacist to refuse to fill a
prescription because of moral or religious objections without fear of legal
repercussions. In 2006, for example, twenty-one states considered legislation that
permits pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions; some bills focus on
contraception alone, while others are not specific to any one type of medication.5
Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, and South Dakota have state laws that
provide legal protection to pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions.6
Alternatively, Illinois, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have duty-to-fill laws
that do not afford legal protection to pharmacists that refuse to fill prescriptions due
to personal beliefs.7
The current conscience clause legislation debate is largely focused on birth
control.8 Increasingly, however, other types of research are engulfed by the same
moral and religious arguments as those used against the reproductive rights
movement. Specifically, many similar arguments surround the therapeutic
embryonic stem cell research debates.
In 2001, the federal government placed a practical ban on the federal funding
of therapeutic stem cell research. In the ensuing years, numerous states passed
legislation supporting stem cell research. In the spring of 2009, President Obama

4. Marcia D. Greenberger & Rachael Vogelstein, Pharmacist Refusals: A Threat to Women’s
Health, 308 SCIENCE 1557, 1558 (2005) (“Since 1997, 28 states have introduced legislation that would
permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense, and sometimes to refer or transfer, drugs on the basis of moral
or religious grounds”). See also R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver
Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2471 (2005) (discussing the potential expansive application
of medical conscience clause legislation, including therapy developed through stem cell research);
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS 1 (2009), available
at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Birth-Control-Pharmacy-Access.pdf (last visited Nov.
11, 2010) [hereinafter GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS].
5. See GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 4, at 7. See also,
Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4, at 1558 (“Fifteen states have introduced such bills in the 2005
legislative session alone.”).
6. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., PHARMACY REFUSALS 101 3 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pharmacyrefusals101.410.pdf; Cantor & Baum, supra note
1, at 2008 (stating that these states have explicit laws to legally protect the pharmacists to refuse who
dispense contraception medication).
7. Charo, supra note 4, at 2472 fig.1 (illustrating the states’ pharmacy policies).
8. See, e.g., Sarah Tomkowiak, Comment, Reconciling Principles and Prescriptions: Do
Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Strike the Appropriate Balance Between Pharmacists’ and Patients’
Rights?, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2007).
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reversed the Bush Administration’s practical ban on embryonic stem cell research.9
In July 2009, the government released embryonic stem cell research guidelines.10
Many hope that with the injection of federal money and support it is only a matter
of time before beneficial medical procedures and medications develop through
stem cell research.
Stem cell research raises numerous policy considerations that need to be
analyzed as this research moves forward, such as compensation for donors and
reproductive versus therapeutic stem cell research. This Article argues that, among
the many policy avenues that need to be addressed regarding stem cell research,
one important area is patient access to prescription drugs. State legislators are
attempting to pass conscience clause legislation that is aimed at stem cell research.
A state senator from Washington, for example, introduced a bill to expand a
conscience clause to include treatments discovered through biomedical research.11
Specifically, the introduced bill stated: “Biotechnology may create new
objectionable medical options in the future.”12 The introduced bill provided:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be required to pay for
or otherwise provide, directly or indirectly, any biomedical treatment, service,
procedure, pharmaceutical, or technology to which that person has a bona fide
doctrinal religious objection.”13 Although this bill did not become law, it provides
a glimpse of the potential expansive nature of pharmacist conscience clauses.14
The goals of this Article are two-fold: (1) to explain that pharmacist
conscience clause legislation may be expanded to areas concerning controversial
biomedical research; and (2) to demonstrate that welfare economics can be applied
to analyze pharmacist conscience clause legislation. Regarding the first goal, the
broad language of existing and proposed conscience clause legislation creates an
umbrella that allows a pharmacist to escape liability for refusing to fill a
prescription for almost any type of medication. With respect to the second goal,
this Article applies welfare economics to demonstrate that pharmacist conscience
clauses are a part of tort law and can be analyzed as such to determine whether
social welfare is maximized.
A legal framework is needed to ensure that patients receive their medications.
Applying principles from welfare economics may allow states to acknowledge that
conscience clauses are akin to a no-liability regime, and this may not be in the best
interest of its citizens. As a precursor, conscience clause legislation has no bearing
on the pharmacist’s professional role in patient safety. By applying welfare
economics, courts or policymakers may determine that pharmacists should be held
to the duty of care as established by the state courts or state licensing boards and
9. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
13505].
10. Raynard S. Kington, Acting Director, Nat’l Inst. of Health, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/2009guidelines.htm
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL
RESEARCH].
11. S.B. 5879, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (unenacted).
12. Id. § 1.
13. Id. § 2(1).
14. In addition, this bill did not receive a hearing. Washington Votes, 2003 Senate Bill 5879,
http://www.washingtonvotes.org/2003-SB-5879#aBillComments (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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potentially subject to liability for a refusal to fill a valid and safe prescription. If,
however, the states continue to pass conscience clause legislation, then the federal
government may decide to legislate or regulate a policy to protect patients’ access
to prescription drugs.
Part II of this Article explains the role of pharmacists as the gatekeeper for
drugs.15 Pharmacists receive specialized education designed to understand drug
pathways, interactions, side effects, and other important characteristics in order to
ensure a patient receives an appropriate drug that will not interact adversely with
other medications. Pharmacists hold the responsibility to communicate with a
prescribing physician if they identify adverse drug interactions or to clarify other
issues surrounding prescriptions.16 During the past ten years, this country
witnessed an expansion of the pharmacist’s role in dispensing prescription drugs, in
large part due to refusals through conscience clause legislation.
In Part III, this Article describes conscience clause legislation designed to
protect pharmacists who refuse to dispense prescriptions. These conscience clauses
spurred a huge debate over the interaction of a pharmacist with a patient in the
medical literature, legal scholarship, and popular press, and this Article will present
the myriad of arguments on all sides.17 The current legal debate in this area applies
principles of fairness to argue for or against conscience clause legislation. In Part
V, however, this Article argues that an economic approach— as opposed to fairness
arguments—should be utilized to determine whether pharmacist conscience clauses
maximize social welfare.
Part IV considers whether the momentum of the state initiatives to allow
pharmacists to refuse to dispense birth control could potentially be expanded to
drugs discovered by controversial biomedical research. Already, for example,
some Catholic hospitals do not provide emergency contraception to rape victims
for religious reasons.18
Furthermore, watchdog groups communicate to
pharmacists promoting the use of conscience clauses.19 Because many of the
arguments used to support anti-contraception positions are also applied against
embryonic stem cell research, it is reasonable to believe that groups that advocate
15. William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the
Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 5 OHIO N.U. J. PHARMACY & L. 1, 2-5 (1996) (describing the role of
pharmacists).
16. See, e.g., id. at 4-5; Sarah J. Vokes, Comment, Just Fill the Prescription: Why Illinois’
Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception in the
Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ. 399, 406-07 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009-10 (stating the arguments against a
pharmacist’s right to object); Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate
Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17
J.L. & HEALTH 77, 78 (2002-03) (suggesting measures should exist to protect “pharmacists from having
to act contrary to their basic moral convictions”); Katie Fairbank, Waging a Moral Battle From Behind
the Counter—Pharmacists’ Refusal to Fill Contraception Prescriptions Prompts the Question: Whose
Choice is it to Make?, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2005, at 1A (quoting a Planned Parenthood
Employee as saying “I can almost guarantee you those same pharmacies wouldn’t have an objection to
Viagra”).
18. Deborah
Weiss,
Emergency
Contraception—History
and
Access,
at
4,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/EC_060309.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (describing
the study of rape victims’ access to emergency contraception in emergency rooms).
19. See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life International, http://www.pfli.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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for pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control will communicate
information to pharmacists concerning drugs developed through stem cell research.
This Article describes how some of the conscience clause laws are so broadly
worded that they could potentially be applied to other controversial areas, in
particular, medications discovered through stem cell research.20
Part V of this Article provides that the application of principles from welfare
economics may demonstrate that the protection from liability for pharmacists who
refuse to fill a prescription due to the pharmacist’s personal or religious beliefs fails
to maximize social welfare. The application of welfare economics in this Article is
a markedly different approach compared to the fairness arguments discussed in
legal scholarship, medical literature, and the popular press. In general, each state’s
common law or state licensing provisions will set the professional standard of care
for pharmacists. Conscience clauses, however, statutorily protect pharmacists from
liability when refusing to fill a prescription. This Article suggests that pharmacist
conscience clauses mimic a no-liability regime under tort law, which may fail to
maximize social welfare. Should the states continue to ignore the impact of
pharmacist conscience clauses, federal oversight through legislative and regulatory
measures may be enacted to ensure patients receive prescription drugs. Duty-to-fill
legislation, for example, introduced in the Senate21 and the House of
Representatives,22 is one proposed alternative that requires pharmacies to fill
prescriptions. This Article proposes amendments to strengthen the proposed dutyto-fill legislation.
As we move forward into areas of controversial biomedical research, such as
stem cell research, broadly worded conscience clauses can be applied to an
increasing number of drugs. Understanding the position of opponents to stem cell
research in relation to the conscience clause landscape provides an opportunity to
analyze and progressively address issues related to patients’ access to prescription
drugs.
II. THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE AS A GATEKEEPER
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classifies drugs as safe and
effective for use by one of two main mechanisms. Drugs can be purchased as
“over the counter” (OTC) meaning that the drug’s benefits outweigh the risks,
potential for abuse is low, labels provide adequate information, and a person can
self-medicate.23 The FDA classifies a second group of drugs as “prescription only”
if they believe the drug could be misused under the self-medication regime

20. Cf. Angela K. Brown, Lawsuit Protection Helps South Dakota Druggists Bring Beliefs to Work,
CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1998, at C2 (“‘They’ve been chipping away at Roe vs. Wade for years,’ said
Thelma Underberg, South Dakota Director of the National Abortion Reproductive Rights Action
League. ‘They’re starting with what they can control.’”).
21. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. (2005).
22. Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005).
23. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. FDA, Regulation of Nonprescription Products,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/cder/ucm093452.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2010).
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described for OTC drugs.24 To receive the second class of drugs, a physician
writes a prescription for a particular drug that must be submitted to a licensed
pharmacist for dispensing.
In addition, pharmacists have a heightened
responsibility when dispensing controlled substances, such as narcotics, because of
the highly addictive nature of the drugs and the potential for abuse.
A pharmacist is a medical professional.25 A pharmacist plays a role as
gatekeeper to ensure prescriptions are written according to proper procedures and
to dispense drugs with accuracy.26 First, a pharmacist can only fill a prescription
written by a physician with the authority to prescribe that particular type of
medication. For example, if a patient changes doctors, a pharmacist is no longer
obligated to fill prescriptions for a person once the doctor-patient relationship has
ceased.27 Second, pharmacists review prescriptions for safety concerns such as
adverse drug interactions, allergies, and incorrect drug for the disease.28
Pharmacists consult with the patients about doses and side effects.29 If problems
are detected, the pharmacist intervenes by contacting the prescribing physician.
The pharmacist is part of the chain of patient care.
The pharmacist gatekeeper functions relate to the medical needs of patients
and it does not include an exception for moral, religious, or ethical objections to
certain types of medications. Without the protection of a conscience clause, a
pharmacist may be held liable for failing to dispense valid and safe prescriptions
due to personal beliefs.30 Indeed, as described in more detail below, some state’s
conscience clause laws specifically provide protection for pharmacists refusing to
fill prescriptions for contraception and assisted suicide. Other states have broader
conscience clauses that are not limited to specific classes of drugs. In response to
states with conscience clauses, other states, such as New Jersey, enacted legislation
that places the responsibility on the pharmacy to fill safe and valid prescriptions.31
24. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRODUCTS WE REGULATE,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/default.htm#Prescription%20Drug%20Information (last updated Sept. 27,
2005).
25. See, e.g., Professional, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional (last visited Nov.
11, 2010); Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines professional as:
A high standard of professional ethics, behavior and work activities while carrying out one's profession
(as an employee, self-employed person, career, enterprise, business, company, or
partnership/associate/colleague, etc.). The professional owes a higher duty to a client, often a privilege
of confidentiality, as well as a duty not to abandon the client just because he or she may not be able to
pay or remunerate the professional. Often the professional is required to put the interest of the client
ahead of his own interests.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/professional.
26. See Vokes, supra note 16, at 406-07 (describing role of pharmacists); See also Claire A.
Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for
Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 512-13 (2006).
27. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 15, at 3.
28. Henri R. Manasse Jr., Conscientious Objection and the Pharmacist, 308 SCIENCE 1558, 1559
(2005) (“Pharmacists also perform critical quality checks to detect and prevent harmful drug
interactions, adverse reactions, and mistakes.”).
29. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 15, at 4-5 (describing the role of pharmacists under the
Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990).
30. See Noesen, 751 N.W.2d at 393-94. See also Smearman, supra note 26, at 512-13 (describing
that state regulations enumerate the circumstances when a pharmacist should refuse to dispense a drug).
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-67.1(a) (West 2007). The statute provides in relevant part:
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The upshot is that traditionally a pharmacist is supposed to fill all valid and safe
prescriptions for FDA approved drugs; however, the recent surge of state
conscience clauses is changing the ability of a patient to receive their prescription
drugs.
III. CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION AND THE ATTENDANT ARGUMENTS
Following Roe v. Wade, the federal government and forty-six states enacted
conscience clauses to protect medical professionals who do not want to perform
procedures that are against their personal beliefs, most notably abortions.32
Recently, multiple states enacted similar measures for pharmacists who may not
want to dispense medication that is against their beliefs.33 At least five states have
pharmacist conscience clause legislation34 and these conscience clauses can be
divided into two groups. The first group includes pharmacist conscience clauses
that specifically enumerate the types of drugs that a pharmacist may refuse to fill.35
The second group contains broadly worded conscience clause legislation that
protects a pharmacist who refuses to dispense any drug that is against their personal
beliefs.36
Diverse opinions in the religious, legal, and medical communities argue along
a continuum about these statutes. Proponents of conscience clauses argue that
these statutes are a welcome effort to allow pharmacists to exercise their personal
beliefs. At the other end, opponents argue these clauses are a major threat to the
doctor-patient relationship and women’s rights. Those in the middle see the
conscience clauses as a balancing act where the pharmacist may exercise personal
beliefs so long as another method, such as referral, is available to the patient.
These arguments look at notions of fairness regarding the pharmacists and patients.
In Part V, however, this Article argues that the application of welfare economics—
A pharmacy practice site has a duty to properly fill lawful prescriptions for prescription drugs or devices
that it carries for customers, without undue delay, despite any conflicts of employees to filling a
prescription and dispensing a particular prescription drug or device due to sincerely held moral,
philosophical or religious beliefs.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1973) [hereinafter Church Amendment]; Holly Teliska, Obstacles to
Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and LowIncome Women, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 233-34 (describing the history of refusal
clauses); Smearman, supra note 26, at 476 (2006) (“In 1973, the same year Roe v. Wade was decided,
Congress enacted the first federal refusal statute, known as the Church Amendment”); Leora Eisenstadt,
Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously
Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE. J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 144-47 (2003) (describing the background of the
Church Amendment). See generally, Bryan A. Dykes, Notes: Proposed Rights of Conscience
Legislation: Expanding to Include Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REV. 565,
569-85 (2002) (describing in detail numerous state conscience clauses for medical providers).
33. Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4; Charo, supra note 4; GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCES
TO PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 4.
34. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-304, 20-1-304(4) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2010); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n) (2001); The
Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-107-1 (West, 2010).
35. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-304, 20-1-304(4) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2010)
36. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n) (2001); The Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience
Act, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-107-1 (West, 2010).
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and not fairness positions alone—is the preferable method to analyze whether
pharmacist conscience clauses maximize social welfare.
A. State Conscience Clause Legislation for Pharmacists
Proponents of conscience clauses view this legislation as a way to protect a
pharmacist who faces a moral dilemma when dispensing a drug that may be against
their personal beliefs.37 Often centered on the birth control and abortion debates,
supporters argue that pharmacists who are against drugs that fall within the family
of offensive reproductive services should not be required to dispense them.38
Indeed, they believe that even the passive distribution of birth control pills or
emergency contraception (EC) is an integral part of the decision not to have a
child.39 In the legal scholarship, some argue that the Free Exercise Clause may
lend support for the protection of pharmacists via conscience clauses.40 In addition,
proponents of conscience clauses posit that protections under Title VII—which
prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of religion—may not afford
enough protection to pharmacists; therefore, conscience clauses are needed to
protect the pharmacist’s religious position.41 In sum, the legal scholarship and
other commentators in support of conscience clause legislation argue that it is fair
to allow a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription that is against the pharmacist’s
personal beliefs.
1. Group 1: Pharmacist Conscience Clauses
Arkansas, Florida, and South Dakota are in the first group of states with
pharmacist conscience clause legislation. In these states, a pharmacist is protected
from facing liability for refusing to dispense enumerated classes of drugs.
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, Arkansas enacted a
conscience clause that allows pharmacists to refuse to fill a prescription for
contraceptives.42 Specifically, the Arkansas law provides: “Nothing in this
subchapter shall prohibit a physician, pharmacists, or any other authorized
37. Herbe, supra note 17, at 78 (suggesting measures should exist to protect “pharmacists from
having to act contrary to their basic moral convictions”); see generally Courtney Miller, Note,
Reflections on Protecting Conscience for Health Care Providers: A Call for More Inclusive Statutory
Protection in Light of Constitutional Considerations, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 327, 342-62
(2006) (proponent of expansive conscience clause legislation).
38. Miller, supra note 37, at 351 (“These individuals have a moral allergy to something in the
workplace similar to a physical allergy that others might have to a certain substance in the workplace.”)
(emphasis added).
39. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009 (“Although some observers argue that active
participation in an abortion is distinct from passively dispensing emergency contraception, others
believe that making such a distinction between active and passive participation is meaningless, because
both forms link the provider to the final outcome in the chain of causation.”).
40. Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The Quest for
Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779,
789-91 (2007) (raising underlying issues as to why pharmacists may want the protection afforded under
conscience clause legislation).
41. Id. at 791-95 (discussing arguments related to protection under Title VII); see also Miller, supra
note 37, at 335 (noting that “Title VII does not constitute a very solid line of defense”).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (West 2010).
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paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive procedures,
supplies or information.”43 Although limited to contraceptives, this statute does not
provide any patient safeguard, such as referral or transfer to another provider.
In 2003, Florida enacted a statute that applies to pharmacists. Florida’s statute
governing family planning provides:
The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted so as to prevent a physician
or other person from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or family planning
service, supplies, or information for medical or religious reasons; and the
44
physicians or other person shall not be held liable for such refusal.

Florida’s statute is limited to birth control; however, it does not require a referral to
another provider.
South Dakota enacted a pharmacist conscience clause that protects pharmacists
when refusing to dispense medication for services including abortion, assisted
suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.45 While the South Dakota law is specific in
the types of medications covered under the statute, other states have enacted more
encompassing laws.
In sum, in this grouping of conscience clauses, pharmacists are protected if
they refuse to fill prescriptions for certain types of drugs, mostly birth control.
These conscience clauses are narrower than the second group of conscience
clauses.
2. Group 2: Pharmacist Conscience Clauses
Georgia and Mississippi are in the second group of states with pharmacist
conscience clauses. In these states, the language of the legislation is broadly
worded and a pharmacist can avoid liability for refusing to fill a prescription for
any medication.
In 2001, Georgia enacted a broad regulation allowing pharmacists to refuse to
fill a prescription for any medication based on “professional judgment or ethical or
moral beliefs.”46 Georgia’s regulation is broad in two respects. First, the
regulation can be applied to any drug.47 That is, nothing in the regulation limits a
pharmacist from refusing to fill a prescription for drugs developed through
controversial biomedical research, such as drugs developed through stem cell
research. Second, Georgia’s regulation does not provide the patient with any
protection, such as a referral or transfer provision.48
43. Id. § 20-16-304(4).
44. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
45. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2010); Angela K. Brown, Lawsuit Protection Helps South
Dakota Druggists Bring Beliefs to Work, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1998, at C2 (stating the South Dakota bill
passed the house 57-10 and the senate 30-3. This article discusses that the debates about the bill were
more emotional than logical).
46. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 480-5-.03(n) (2001).
47. Id.; see generally NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, PHARMACY REFUSALS: STATE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES, http://www.nwlc.org/resource/pharmacy-refusals-state-laws-regulationsand-policies (last visited Dec. 15, 2010) [hereinafter PHARMACY REFUSALS: STATE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES].
48. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 480-5-.03(n); see also PHARMACY REFUSALS: STATE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES, supra note 47.
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In 2004, the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act was signed into
law.49 This Act protects pharmacists who refuse to participate in any health-related
service that is against their personal beliefs.50 In addition, the Mississippi Act does
not require referral to another provider.
In contrast to the Group 1 legislation, which is limited in scope, the broad
coverage of the Mississippi Act and Georgia’s regulation could potentially be
interpreted to cover any area of health care.51 That is, it is possible that a
pharmacist could refuse to dispense a variety of medications as well as refuse to
refer a patient elsewhere. As the therapeutic stem cell research debate is engulfed
by many of the same arguments seen in the reproductive rights struggle,52 it is
possible that patients will be refused access to drugs that are developed through
stem cell research if states continue to pass wide-reaching Group 2 Pharmacist
Conscience Clause-type legislation.
B. Duty-to-Fill—Opposition to Pharmacist Conscience Clauses
Opponents to conscience clause statutes argue that pharmacists have a
professional duty of care and their refusal to dispense prescriptions violates this
duty and adversely affects patients.53 Others feel that these statutes are a covert
operation by anti-choice groups in an attempt to find yet another way to interfere
with a woman’s reproductive rights.54 Women’s rights groups argue that a
pharmacist’s refusal to fill a birth control prescription can have devastating effects
on women who want to prevent unintended pregnancies and wish to time and space
their pregnancies.55 In addition, others argue that the pharmacist, acting as a thirdparty, has no right to override a physician’s decision to prescribe a drug to a
patient.56
Legal scholarship in this area analyzes the application of a myriad of
arguments related to conscience clauses. Some argue that pharmacists would fail
to establish that a common law duty-to-fill all prescriptions would violate the Free
Exercise Clause.57 Other scholars debate whether conscience clauses violate the
49. The Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1 (West
2010).
50. Teliska, supra note 32, at 243-44 (describing the Mississippi Act).
51. See Georgia Chudoba, Comment, Conscience in America: The Slippery Slope of Mixing
Morality with Medicine, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 85, 99 (2007) (generally observing that the broad Mississippi
conscience clause could apply to treatments developed through stem cell research).
52. Deborah Barfield, Abortion, Suicide Issues Thrust Pharmacists Into Moral Debate, BUFF.
NEWS, May 19, 1998, at A3 (stating that the South Dakota conscience clause bill was pushed by the
South Dakota Right to Life group).
53. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009-10 (stating the arguments against a pharmacist’s right to
object).
54. J.W. Griffis, Jr. Editorial letters: Pharmacists Can Refuse to be Part of an Abortion, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 2, 1997 at 9A.
55. Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4, at 1557 (explaining how pharmacist refusals can have
“devastating consequences” for women’s health).
56. Bray, supra note 2 (“When a woman and her doctor decide that a prescription for contraception
is in the woman’s best interest, a third party has no right to override that decision.”).
57. Lora Cicconi, Comment, Pharmacist Refusals and Third-Party Interests: A Proposed Judicial
Approach to Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 54 UCLA L. REV. 709, 728-34 (2007) (concluding that
“[i]n sum, though federal and state religious freedom clauses prohibit the state from infringing upon the
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Establishment Clause.58 Further, it appears undisputed in the literature that a
pharmacist could not sustain a Title VII claim against an employer that would not
agree to accommodate an objecting pharmacist.59 The American Bar Association
(ABA) weighed in against conscience clauses. The ABA drafted a report
condemning conscience clause regulations that interfere with any patient’s ability
to receive information from his or her health care providers in order to make
informed decisions.60 In sum, the debate in the legal scholarship, medical
literature, and other groups present fairness arguments—it is not fair to the patients
for the pharmacist to refuse to fill the prescription.
In opposition to the pharmacist conscience clause legislation described above,
several states passed or considered legislation that requires pharmacies or
pharmacists to fill all valid prescriptions.61 Collectively referred to as “duty-to-fill”
legislation, they require the pharmacist to fill all prescriptions, absent a medical
reason not to fill the prescription. For example, in response to a highly publicized
refusal by a pharmacist in Chicago to dispense emergency contraception (EC),
Illinois enacted an emergency rule ordering pharmacists to fill “morning-after pill”
prescriptions.62 Some states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Colorado have
enacted or are considering bills that specifically address EC by requiring hospitals
to provide it to rape victims or to allow certain pharmacists to sell EC without a
prescription.63 These laws, however, only address EC and not the myriad of other
drugs that could be covered under expansive conscience clauses.
At the state level, certain states enacted legislation requiring pharmacies to
ensure that pharmacists fill legal prescriptions.64 The New Jersey statute, for
religious exercise of its citizens, they may not exempt pharmacists from their general duty to serve
patients”).
58. Smearman, supra note 26 at 530-34 (“[T]he Establishment Clause would not prohibit such a
religious accommodation, provided that the refusal clause did not impose significant burdens on the
rights of others.”).
59. Cicconi, supra note 57, at 725-28 (discussing how Title VII would not protect a pharmacist who
refuses to fill a prescription). See also Harrington, supra note 40, at 791-96 (discussing the interaction
of conscience clauses with Title VII).
60. Tresa Baldas, Fighting Refusal to Treat: ‘Conscience’ Clauses Hit the Courts, THE NAT’L L. J.,
Feb. 7, 2005, at 1. Baldas noted:
According to [Robyn Shapiro, who sits on the ABA’s section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities],
the recent legislation, known as ‘refusal’ and ‘conscience’ clauses, stirred some interest in the ABA,
which formed a panel to investigate the proposed bills. As a member of that team, she helped draft a
report that condemned the proposed statutes and will be presented to the ABA’s House of Delegates at
its upcoming ABA Mid-Year Meeting . . . .
Id.
61. See GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 4.
62. Abdon M. Pallasch, Sell Contraceptives, Gov Orders Druggists; Rule Follows Refusal by
Pharmacist to Dispense Morning-After Pills Here, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at 5.
63. Manasse Jr., supra note 29, at 1559.
64. Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex Pill and Widen Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005 at A16 (stating that California and West Virginia have both duty-to-fill bills and
conscience clause bills pending in the state legislature); Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1353 (stating
California, Illinois, Nevada, Maine, and New York have duty-to-fill laws); AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N,
ISSUE BRIEF ON CONSCIENCE CLAUSES (2009); Cicconi, supra note 57, at 710, noting:
On September 29, 2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill 644 into law,
which allows a pharmacist to refuse to dispense medications on ethical, religious, or moral grounds, but
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example, provides:
A pharmacy practice site has a duty to properly fill lawful prescriptions for
prescription drugs or devices that it carries for customers, without undue delay,
despite any conflicts of employees to filling a prescription and dispensing a
particular prescription drug or device due to sincerely held moral, philosophical or
65
religious beliefs.

While New Jersey’s statute places the onus on the pharmacy to ensure that valid
prescriptions are filled, this legislation does not require the pharmacy to carry all
medications—that is, the pharmacy could choose not to stock contraceptives or
drugs developed through controversial biomedical research. Although New
Jersey’s statute provides safeguards so that a patient will be referred to a pharmacy
that is reasonably accessible to the patient and transfers the prescription, the
pharmacy itself is not obligated to carry any particular prescription drug or
device.66
At the federal level, Senators Barbara Boxer and Frank R. Lautenberg
introduced a bill, the Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which requires
all legal prescriptions are filled.67 This bill provides: “The pharmacy ensures that
each valid prescription is filled without unnecessary delay or other interference,
consistent with the normal timeframe for filling prescriptions.”68 A similar bill,
entitled the “Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act,” was proposed in the House as
well.69 The House bill ensures that pharmacies fill prescriptions regardless of the
personal beliefs of a single pharmacist.70 Further, it contains a private cause of
action.71 The findings to the House bill, however, appear to relate only to the
struggle between a pharmacist’s religious beliefs and the individual’s right to legal
contraception.72 Arguably, the House bill is limited because it does not state
findings beyond contraception, thus potentially limiting its application to
contraception alone. Neither of these federal bills is enacted.
Some opponents to pharmacist conscience clauses are concerned about both
hypocrisy and expansion. Some argue that it is hypocritical for pharmacists to fill
prescriptions for Viagra while not dispensing birth control.73 Others suggest that
the conscience clauses could be expanded to other controversial areas including

only in cases where the pharmacist has notified his employer in advance of the drugs to which he
objects, and only if the employer can reasonably accommodate the objection without undue hardship.
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-67.1(a) (West 2007). See also AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF
ON CONSCIENCE CLAUSES (2008).
66. Id. § 45:14-67.1(c).
67. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Davey &
Belluck, supra note 64, at A1 (discussing the federal actions).
68. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
69. Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005).
70. Id. § 3(a).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 2.
73. Sheila Swenholt, Reader Response, Pharmacist’s Refusal Raises Questions, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 2, 2004, at 10B (“What about Viagra?”); Fairbank, supra note 17, at 1A (quoting
Planned Parenthood Employee Tony Thorton: “I can guarantee you those same pharmacies wouldn’t
have an objection to Viagra”).
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mental health,74 HIV,75 antibiotics for sexually transmitted diseases,76 and drugs
discovered through stem cell research.77 Some analogize the discretion as to
whether to fill a prescription to the days of segregation. A letter to the editor in the
Washington Post stated: “This reminds me of the days of desegregation, when
some restaurants[’] owners argued that they would not serve blacks because it was
contrary to their beliefs. The country decided that they were wrong.”78
C. A Middle Ground Proposal
In this debate, some groups propose a compromise that edits the current
pharmacist conscience clause legislation to allow pharmacists to refuse to fill
prescriptions due to personal beliefs, while requiring that an alternative method for
the patient to receive the prescription be made available.
While not legally enforceable, the American Pharmacists Association (APhA)
sets ethical guidelines that many states refer to when crafting and adopting their
state laws regulating pharmacists.79 The APhA has taken what it considers to be a
middle ground and provided that a pharmacist should not be required to dispense a
medication that is against his or her personal beliefs; however, an alternative
system should be in place to allow the patient to fill the prescription.80 Examples
of alternative systems could be another pharmacist on duty at the same time that
can fill the prescription or a referral to another pharmacist that will either be
working a different shift at that pharmacy or is employed by a different pharmacy.
Opponents to the APhA’s position cite guidelines in the Code of Ethics that
conflict with the referral policy.81 The Code articulates that pharmacists place
“concern for the well-being of the patient at the center of professional practice” and
that the pharmacist must “respect personal and cultural differences.”82
Another middle ground approach is offered by Julie Cantor and Ken Baum.
74. Carolyn G. Maurer, Reader Response: Pharmacist’s Refusal Raises Questions, THE DALLAS
MORNING STAR, Apr. 2, 2004, at 10B (fearing the refusal to fill prescriptions for mental health drugs).
75. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2010 (discussing potential discrimination against persons with
HIV).
76. Bray, supra note 2, at B7 (arguing that pharmacists my deny antibiotics for sexually transmitted
diseases based on perceived immorality).
77. Charo, supra note 4, at 2471 (discussing therapies developed through stem cell research).
78. Joe Lieberson, Letter to the Editor, Just What the Doctor Ordered, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2005,
at B6.
79. Teliska, supra note 32, at 235-36 (describing the APhA’s role with respect to pharmacists and
the position it takes on refusal clauses).
80. 2010 HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT OF THE POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE, AMERICAN
PHARMACISTS
ASSOCIATION
2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=House_of_Delegates&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=22384
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010). See also Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate: Because
of Beliefs, Some Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A10 (“The
American Pharmacists Association recently reaffirmed its policy that pharmacists can refuse to fill
prescriptions as long as they make sure customers can get their medications some other way”); Editorial,
Business, Morality and Privacy, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 3, 2005, at 5H (stating
the APhA position).
81. Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4, at 1558 (discussing the APhA’s potentially conflicting
policies).
82. Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).
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They propose a balancing approach similar to the APhA’s approach with respect to
EC.83 In their proposal, all pharmacies should stock EC and have at least one
pharmacist on duty at all times willing to dispense the prescription.84 In the
alternative, if the pharmacy adopts a policy not to stock EC, then a notice should be
clearly displayed that they do not sell EC and provides information as to where one
could fill the prescription.85 In addition, objecting pharmacists would be required
to provide referrals within a reasonable distance to the pharmacy.86 Opponents to
this plan argue that EC is a time sensitive drug and that having to travel to other
pharmacies may place a heavy burden on a woman, particularly on women living in
rural communities.87
Legal scholarship, medical literature, advocacy groups, and the popular press
debate the pharmacist conscience clause landscape. The positions described above
focus on notions of fairness—either what is fair to the pharmacist, or the patient, or
a middle ground that is somewhat fair to both sides. These groups battle using
fairness-based arguments and the debate is unsatisfactory because each side
appears vested in value-based assessments. The current state of the debate appears
to be at an impasse. This Article proposes that pharmacist conscience clauses have
the potential to expand in an era of controversial biomedical research and that
welfare economics—and not fairness arguments alone—provides the appropriate
analysis for conscience clause legislation.
IV. APPLICATION OF CONSCIENCE CLAUSES TO DISCOVERIES BASED ON STEM CELL
RESEARCH
To date, the majority of pharmacists’ personal objections to the requirement to
dispense all medications are scooped up by the abortion debates. Indeed, it was the
“abortion wars” that started the conscience clause movement.88 Pharmacists with
anti-choice beliefs argue they should not be required to fill prescriptions for birth
control or EC. Nuanced within this position is the issue that some pharmacists will
fill prescriptions for birth control, but not EC because they mistakenly believe EC
causes an abortion. Medical research, however, shows that EC is contraception and
has no effect on established pregnancies.89 Furthermore, some pharmacists do not
accept the medical definition of pregnancy as beginning with implantation in the
uterus, believing instead that life begins at fertilization.90 Pharmacists for Life
International, an Ohio-based group, argue that pharmacists should not have to fill

83. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2011.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Teliska, supra note 32, at 243-48 (discussing the impact on low-income and rural women).
88. Charo, supra note 4, at 2471.
89. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009.
90. Deanna Martin, Rx Abortion Bill Stalls in Senate, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Jan. 25, 2008,
at 5C (“[S]ome may believe that life begins at fertilization—not at the medical definition of
implantation in the uterus—and could therefore think some contraceptives cause an abortion.”).
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prescriptions that prevent pregnancy.91 The abortion issue continues to be a
divisive topic in political campaigns, judicial appointments, press reports, and
numerous other areas of daily life.92 Opponents to abortion support their beliefs by
attacking on multiple fronts,93 including biomedical research such as stem cell
research.94
Many arguments against stem cell research grow out of the abortion debates.
What follows is an explanation of stem cell research and the surrounding debate.
Similar to the misperceptions surrounding EC, many of the ethical and value-based
objections to embryonic stem cell research are based on misinformation and fall
away with a clear understanding of the science involved. Those who oppose
contraception on religious grounds will most likely oppose embryonic stem cell
research because the starting material for some stem cell research is embryos
discarded from fertility clinics. The Catholic Church, for example, explicitly and
openly opposes embryonic stem cell research.95
In 2001, the Bush Administration placed a practical ban on the use of federal
funds to support stem cell research, which was recently revoked by the Obama
Administration.96 While this ban was in effect, states and private entities pushed
forward with stem cell research with the expectation that continued research can
provide insights into new treatments and drugs. If stem cell research is successful,
patients could face obstacles when attempting to fill prescriptions for drugs
developed through this research. For pharmacists who are protected by broad
conscience clauses, it would only be a small step to expand their objections to
therapies based on stem cell research. Furthering this stance by pharmacists,
groups that promote the use of conscience clauses may then disseminate
information to pharmacists so that the pharmacists are aware of which drugs are
developed through stem cell research.97
A. A Description of Stem Cell Research
An understanding of stem cell research is critical to any scientific, legal or
ethical discussion. Researchers became interested in embryonic stem cells because
stem cells have properties that make them good candidates to treat multiple
diseases. Stem cells can be maintained in an undifferentiated state and then

91. Karen L. Brauer, Pharmacists Put Patients’ Interest First, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 14, 2004,
at A19 (describing Pharmacists for Life International). Of note, Karen Brauer is President of
Pharmacists for Life International.
92. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Health Workers’ ‘Conscience’ Rule Set to Be Voided, WASH. POST, Feb.
28, 2009, at A1 (describing the issue of abortion as “one of the most divisive political issues”).
93. Brown, supra note 20.
94. See generally, Connie Bruck, Hollywood Science, THE NEW YORKER Oct. 18, 2004, at 62, 6282.
95. See, e.g., THE VATICAN, REGARDING THE INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE 8,
http://www.usccb.org/comm/Dignitaspersonae/Dignitatis_Vatican_Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2010) [hereinafter THE VATICAN].
96. Exec. Order No. 13505, supra note 9 (“The Presidential statement of August 9, 2001, limiting
Federal funding for research involving human embryonic stem cells, shall have no further effect as a
statement of governmental policy.”).
97. See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life International, supra note 19.
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induced to form a specific cell lineage.98 Scientists hypothesize that this
characteristic will allow them to turn stem cells into various tissues in order to
replace diseased neurons, muscles or organs in a sick person. Illnesses that could
be benefited by this type of treatment include Parkinson’s Disease, heart disease,
diabetes, Alzheimer’s Disease, and others.99 Other promising areas of research that
could be expanded with embryonic stem cell research include understanding
various genetic diseases and generating diseased cells for drug screening.100
Scientists work with two different types of human stem cells, either adult or
embryonic. Adult stem cells may not be ideal starting materials because they have
limitations which may prohibit the ability to induce them to form the wide variety
of cell types that embryonic stem cells can. Most of the controversy surrounding
stem cell research concerns the process of obtaining embryonic stem cells.
Embryonic stem cell lines are usually obtained through an in vitro, i.e. test
tube, fertilization procedure.101 The egg is fertilized in vitro and it is allowed to
grow in a Petri dish for approximately three-to-four days to form a blastocyst that
contains three concentric circles of cells.102 Stem cells are isolated from the innermost circle and then grown in a tissue culture on a plastic dish coated with feeder
cells that provide a sticky surface, nutrients, and growth factors.103 Once the stem
cells are established, they can be grown and used in experiments or frozen and sent
to other laboratories for experiments.104
Another way to create stem cells is to use a technique called somatic cell
nuclear transfer (SCNT).105 This technique allows a scientist to create a diseased
stem cell line by transferring the nucleus of a patient’s cell into an enucleated
egg.106 The egg is then stimulated to divide in vitro and form a blastocyst.107 As
described above, cells from the inner cell mass are extracted after a few days
growth and then induced to form the diseased tissue. This technique is far from
being perfected and controversy surrounded a South Korean scientist who falsified
data in an article in the journal Science stating that his lab could create diseased
cells using SCNT.108 While the promise of studying diseased tissues through stem
98. Stem Cell Information, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, STEM CELL INFORMATION,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010)
[hereinafter NIH STEM CELL INFORMATION]. See generally Joanna K. Sax, The States “Race” with the
Federal Government for Stem-Cell Research, 15 ANNALS. HEALTH L. 1, 5-13 (2006) (describing stem
cell research and see references therein).
99. NIH STEM CELL INFORMATION, supra note 98; Allen M. Spiegal and Gerald D. Fischbach, NIH
Statement Before Senate Appropriations Subcommittee (April 26, 2000), http://stemcells.nih.gov/
policy/statements/State.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
100. Editorial, Disease Insights from Stem Cells, 422 NATURE 787, 787 (2003).
101. Id.
102. NIH STEM CELL INFORMATION, supra note 98.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra
note 10 (federal funding is only available for embryonic stem cells “derived from embryos created using
in vitro fertilization (IVF) for reproductive purposes and no longer needed for these purposes”).
105. Disease Insights from Stem Cells, supra note 100.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Associated Press, Faked Research on Stem Cells is Confirmed by Korean Panel, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2005, at A6 (describing confirmation of the fabrication of stem cell lines); Michael Specter,
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cells created by SCNT is exciting, it appears that the scientific community will be
confronted by many obstacles in mastering this technology.109 The SCNT
technique, in particular, can be used for drug screening.
A national debate, focused on whether life begins in a Petri dish, surrounds the
stem cell research debate. Proponents of stem cell research argue that life does not
begin in a Petri dish. Moreover, they argue, most of the starting material comes
from fertilized eggs destined to be discarded at fertility clinics.110 Proponents
believe that it is more useful to use the discarded eggs for research than to throw
them in the garbage. Opponents argue that it is morally and ethically wrong to
create a “life” with the purpose of destroying it by isolating the inner cell mass.111
The arguments about when life begins echo the abortion debates and it is
reasonable to believe that opponents to stem cell research would employ
conscience clauses and refuse to fill prescriptions for drugs developed through stem
cell research.112
B. Federal and State Policy Governing Stem Cell Research
In 2001, President Bush declared by executive order that the federal
government would not fund stem cell research for any new embryonic stem cell
lines.113 Following the President’s announcement, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) announced that they would not fund research for embryonic stem cell lines
created after 9:00 EDT August 9, 2001.114 This created a practical ban for federal
funds on embryonic stem cell research because only a limited number of stem cell
lines had been created prior to August 9, 2001, and these cells lines had not yet
been characterized, making it unclear whether they could be used in any

Political Science: The Bush Administration’s War on the Laboratory, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 13,
2006, at 58, 67 (asserting that Hwang Woo Suk’s fabricated data hurts the publicity for stem cell
research).
109. The 2009 Federal Guidelines for stem cell research do not allow federal funding for SCNT.
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 10.
110. Disease Insights from Stem Cells, supra note 100 (describing that the cell lines are generated
from no longer wanted fertilized eggs at fertility clinics); William Safire, Reagan’s Next Victory, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2004, at A27 (“[P]roponents say these are left over from in vitro banks and already
destined for destruction, donated by people to whom ‘pro life’ also means saving the lives of suffering
patients.”).
111. Safire, supra note 110 (“Opponents say the harvesting of these cells destroys potential human
life”). See also John M. Broder & Andrew Pollack, Californians to Vote on Spending $3 Billion on
Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004, at A1 (opponents to stem cell research argue that
“researchers must destroy human embryos, an act that is abhorrent to some religious conservatives and
opponents of abortion”).
112. As noted above, some groups promote the use of conscience clauses and may communicate with
pharmacists regarding drugs developed through stem cell research. See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life
International, supra note 19.
113. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Stem Cell Research, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug.
9, 2001, 8:01 PM CDT), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/
20010809-2.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Discussion of President Bush].
114. The Nat’l Inst. Of Health, NIH’s Role in Federal Policy: Stem Cell Research,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/NIHFedPolicy.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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research.115
Congress considered stem cell legislation. The House passed a bill that
prohibits both therapeutic and reproductive cloning and includes a criminal
penalty.116 Senators, on the other hand, introduced a bill that would allow
therapeutic cloning, but ban reproductive cloning.117 In 2007, the Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act of 2007 was passed in both the House and the Senate—
President Bush, however, vetoed the legislation.118 Recently in 2009, the Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act of 2009 was introduced in both the House and the
Senate. 119 These bills are in committee at the time of this writing.120 To date,
Congress does not have a federal policy in effect.
In response to the practical ban on stem cell research at the federal level,
several states passed initiatives allowing stem cell research, although many of these
initiatives were under-funded.121 In 2004, however, Californians passed a $3
billion referendum creating a hospitable home for stem cell researchers.122 Much
of the controversy surrounding California’s initiative centered on the ethical
debates described above.123 Interestingly, however, the California referendum
faced opposition within the scientific community because some believe that stateby-state funding is not an adequate substitute for federal policies and funding.124
Thus, some hoped the federal government would change its policy.125 Since
California passed its stem cell research initiative, other states, such as New Jersey
and Massachusetts, proposed investing millions of dollars in their states’ stem cell
research.126
Both individual states and private institutions fund and conduct stem cell
research. For example, Harvard University opened the Harvard Stem Cell Institute,
where they conduct research that is partially funded by the Howard Hughes

115. Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Appropriations, 108th Cong. 20-21 (2003) (statement of Dr. Ronald McKay, Senior Investigator, Nat’l
Inst. of Nemological Disorders and Stroke); see also Sax, supra note 98, at 15-19 (see references therein
to the scientific debate regarding the stem cell policy).
116. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003).
117. Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2003, S. 303, 108th Cong.
(2003).
118. Stem Cell Research Enactment Act of 2007, S. 5, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-5 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
119. Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 873, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-873 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act of 2009, S. 487, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-487 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
120. H.R. 873, § 487.
121. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:27 (2004).
122. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125300 (West 2004). See also Ceci Connolly, Calif. Stem Cell
Initiative Could Backfire Nationally, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at A15.
123. Connolly, supra note 122, at A15.
124. Bruck, supra note 94, at 64-70.
125. Id.
126. Jonathan Finer, Mass. Senate Passes Stem Cell Bill That May Face Governor’s Veto, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 2005, at A2; Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey Forges Ahead on Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2004, at B1.
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Medical Institute.127 In addition, the private sector, including pharmaceutical
companies, can conduct stem cell research. The potential exists, however, for
ethically questionable practices, and federal guidelines would preemptively protect
subjects, researchers, and patients.128
On March 9, 2009, President Obama issued a statement ordering that the
limitations on embryonic stem cell research by the Bush Administration be
lifted.129 In July 2009, the NIH released the guidelines for stem cell research.130
Despite certain constraints on stem cell research in the federal guidelines, it is clear
that certain types of embryonic stem cell research will be federally funded, thus
allowing this area of research to move forward at a faster clip. The influx of
federal funding will allow scientists all over the country to conduct stem cell
research and hopefully lead to the development of stem cell-based therapies for a
variety of diseases. It is highly unlikely that the opponents of embryonic stem cell
research will accept defeat. Rather, opponents to stem cell research will most
likely continue to attempt to restrict access to therapies developed through stem cell
research. Broadly worded pharmacist conscience clauses—already enacted in two
states—provide an attractive avenue for opponents to stem cell research to restrict
patient access to beneficial therapies.
C. The Controversy Surrounding Plan B as a Backdrop for Debate Regarding
Drugs Developed Through Stem Cell Research
The controversy surrounding Plan B provides a good background for
understanding the interaction between the stem cell research debate and the
arguments related to the potential expansion of pharmacist conscience clauses.
Plan B, also known as the morning-after pill or EC, must be taken within a limited
time frame after unprotected sex in order to prevent pregnancy. Plan B has no
effect on an established pregnancy.131 Originally a prescription drug, a woman was
required to contact a physician after an episode of unprotected sex or contraceptive
failure, receive a prescription, travel to a pharmacy, fill the prescription (assuming
the pharmacist would fill it), and take the medication.132 The risk of pregnancy
increases the longer it takes for a woman to begin Plan B.133
In 2004, the scientific advisors at the FDA overwhelmingly recommended
switching Plan B from a prescription drug to OTC, but in an unprecedented
127. Alvin Powell, From the Laboratory to the Patient, HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE (Apr. 22, 2004),
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/04.22/99-StemOver.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). See
also Claudia Dreifus, At Harvard’s Stem Cell Center, the Barriers Run Wide and Deep, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2006, at F2 (noting that Howard Hughes Medical Institute is providing private funding for
embryonic stem cell research at Harvard); Howard Hughes Medical Institute, New Human Embryonic
Stem-cell
Lines
to
be
Made
Available
to
Researchers
(March
3,
2004),
http://www.hhmi.org/news/melton4.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
128. See generally, Sax, supra note 98, at 33-35 (promoting uniform guidelines).
129. Exec. Order No. 13505, supra note 9.
130. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 10.
131. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009.
132. Alastair J.J. Wood, et al., A Sad Day for Science at the FDA, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197
(Sept. 22, 2005).
133. Id. (“The risk of pregnancy increases from 0.4 percent if contraception is initiated within 24
hours to 2.7 percent if it is initiated 48 to 72 hours after intercourse.”).
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decision, the agency rejected the advice of the scientific advisors.134 This led to an
enormous battle at the FDA with intense ethical debates and ultimately
resignations, including the assistant commissioner for women’s health and director
of the Office of Women’s Health at the FDA, Susan Wood.135 Shortly after the
decision not to move Plan B to OTC status, the commissioner of the FDA, Dr.
Lester Crawford, also resigned.136
The advisory committee at the FDA recommended, in a vote of 23-4, to switch
EC to OTC based on both safety and the importance of receiving the medication in
a limited time frame.137 In addition, studies showed that teenagers understood how
to use Plan B and that its availability had no effect on their behavior.138 The FDA
responded with concerns that young teens may not comprehend the proper use of
EC.139 Some suggest that this reaction is just another example in a long line of
Bush Administration tactics to oppose any line of defense that lessens risk
associated with sex.140 Indeed, the FDA delayed the decision stating that it was
unsure how to restrict access to older age groups because it did not want to
negatively influence the sexual behavior of teens.141 Ultimately, in 2006, Plan B
was approved for OTC, but only for women eighteen years of age and older.142 In
2009, the age limit was lowered to women seventeen years of age and older.143 In
some states, a patient over the age of 17 does not need a prescription for Plan B
from a doctor, but a pharmacist must dispense the drug to the patient.144
The arguments surrounding Plan B are an extension of the abortion debates
134. Specter, supra note 108, at 60 (“The agency had never rejected a similar request against the
advice of its scientific advisors and its own staff.”).
135. Susan F. Wood, Women’s Health and the FDA, 353 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1650, 1650 (2005)
[hereinafter Women’s Health and the FDA] (“Both the relevant advisory committees and the
professional review staff at the FDA’a Center for Drug Evaluation and Research had strongly
recommended that nonprescription status by granted to Plan B emergency contraception
(levonorgestrel), given its safety and the need for timely access for optimal efficacy.”).
136. Id. at 1651.
137. Wood, et al., supra note 132, at 1197. See also Women’s Health and the FDA, supra note 135,
at 1650.
138. Jennifer Couzin, Plan B: A Collision of Science and Politics, 310 SCIENCE 38, 38 (2005) (“The
results were unambiguous: Teenagers appeared to have no trouble understanding how to use Plan B, and
its availability didn’t change their behavior. Those results contributed to the near-unanimity among
FDA scientists and the scientific community that the drug ought to move from prescription-only status
to OTC.”).
139. Id. at 39.
140. Specter, supra note 108, at 58-60 (providing a variety of examples including the failure of
abstinence only education, cutting aid to groups that support abortions and condom use, failure of
virginity “pledge” programs, and lack of support for vaccines).
141. Couzin, supra note 138.
142. Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1338 (“Finally, on August 24, 2006, the FDA approved Plan B for
OTC sales, albeit only for women eighteen and older, who must show proof of age before purchasing
Plan B.”).
143. FED. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Updated FDA Action on Plan B (levonorgestrel) Tablets, (Apr. 22,
2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm149568.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010).
144. See FDA, FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for Plan B for Women 18 and Over,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108717.htm. (“Plan B will
be stocked by pharmacies behind the counter because it cannot be dispensed without a prescription or
proof of age.”).
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and “appears to reflect political meddling in the drug-approval process.”145 These
types of arguments are finding their way into all aspects of drug-related
reproductive rights. As described in Part III, the pharmacist conscience clauses
allow personal beliefs to hinder access to prescription drugs. A similar debate
arose in the FDA process over Plan B. These viewpoints are also weighing in over
stem cell research. Value-based debates appear to enter all fronts of medicine,
science, and technology.
D. Religious Beliefs as Applied to Stem Cell Research
The religious opposition to abortion appears connected to the Bush
Administration’s policy regarding stem cell research. In 2001, President Bush
released a statement in opposition to federal funding to support the creation of new
embryonic stem cell lines based on his personal “belief in the fundamental value
and sanctity of human life.” 146 He also noted that his position on stem cell
research is “shaped by deeply held beliefs.”147 Moreover, opponents to stem cell
research argue that the fertilized embryo used for starting material has the
“potential” for life and should not be purposefully destroyed.148 Interestingly,
Karen Brauer, President of Pharmacists for Life International used the phrase
“purposeful destruction” in an editorial in favor of conscience clauses.149 The
statements used in support of conscience clause legislation mimic the statements
used to oppose stem cell research.
The Catholic Church opposes embryonic stem cell research. In the publication
Regarding the Instruction Dignitas Personae, the Catholic Church classifies
embryonic stem cell research as “gravely illicit.”150 In a conclusory manner, this
publication provides that “adult stem cells give more positive results than
embryonic stem cells.”151 This statement cannot be supported in light of the
obstacles—such as lack of funding—to conducting embryonic stem cell research.
The federal government recently lifted the practical ban on the federal funding of
stem cell research. As mentioned above, it is impossible to know at this time
whether adult stem cells may give better—or even different—results than
embryonic stem cells.
The next logical step for supporters of conscience clause legislation would be
to expand the reach of such legislation to medications derived from stem cell
research.152 Indeed, a state senator in Washington State already introduced an
145. Wood, et al., supra note 132, at 1197.
146. Office of the Press Secretary of President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell
Research
(Aug.
9,
2001),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/
08/20010809-1.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
147. Discussion of President Bush, supra note 113.
148. Jason Scott Robert, Model Systems in Stem Cell Biology, 26 BIO ESSAYS 1005, 1005 (2004)
(discussing the public debate over stem cell research).
149. Brauer, supra note 91.
150. THE VATICAN, supra note 95, at 8.
151. Id.
152. Cf. Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal Beliefs
Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269, 285, 296 (2006)
(discussing the proposed expansion of conscience clauses to include new technologies based on stem
cell research).
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amendment to this effect.153 Even if opponents to stem cell research lose the battle
to private and public funding initiatives, the war can continue at subsequent levels.
Once the FDA approves a drug developed through stem cell research, pharmacists
in states with broad conscience clauses, such as Mississippi and Georgia, could
invoke their personal beliefs and refuse to fill a prescription because they believe
life was destroyed to create the therapy.154
The current scientific atmosphere is charged with energy for discovering new
therapies and drugs based on stem cell research. Numerous areas are open to
debate, including compensation for donors and the 2009 federal guidelines.155 This
Article argues that, among the many policy avenues that need to be addressed
regarding stem cell research, one important area concerns patients’ rights.
Because of the value-based nature of their arguments, proponents and
opponents of stem cell research are at an impasse. In Part V, this Article argues
that we should move away from a solely value-based dialogue and approach this
discussion from a different perspective—that of normative economics.
V. THE APPLICATION OF WELFARE ECONOMICS TO PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE
CLAUSE LEGISLATION
A wide breadth of literature applies economic analyses to provide guidance,
support, or disagree with policy decisions. Law and economic scholarship focuses,
in part, on whether various forms of economic rationale can provide guidance for
law-makers. The phrase “law and economics” covers a large area of scholarship,
some of which is applicable to conscience clauses. Recent scholarship by Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell applies welfare economics—which focuses on
individuals’ well-being—to various areas of the law.156 In their work, Kaplow and
Shavell argue that the application of welfare economics provides superior results
based on efficiency rather than using the traditional notions of fairness.157
As highlighted in Part III, the discussion regarding pharmacist conscience
clauses weighs the religious beliefs of the objecting pharmacist against the ability
of the patient to receive their valid prescription drug—that is, the discussion is
focused on notions of fairness to each side. The debate appears to be at an impasse.
Legal scholarship debating conscience clauses also focuses on notions of
fairness158—including, but not limited to, first amendment jurisprudence, Title VII,
women’s rights, feminist legal theory, right to privacy, use of various litigation
tactics, etc.159 Applying these notions of fairness, legal scholars and advocacy
153. S.B. 5878, 2003 Leg. (Wa. 2003).
154. As mentioned above, it is possible that certain groups may communicate with pharmacists
regarding the invocation of conscience clauses to refuse to fill prescriptions. See, e.g., Pharmacists for
Life International, supra note 19.
155. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 10.
156. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
157. Id. at 105.
158. Id. at 39 n.48 (defining fairness to “refer to any principle that does not depend solely on the
well-being of individuals” and stating that arguments based on “fairness-based analysis are broadly
applicable to analyses based on justice or rights”).
159. See generally Smearman, supra note 26; Herbe, supra note 17, at 101; Tomkowiak, supra note
8; Teliska, supra note 32; Miller, supra note 37; Eisenstadt, supra note 32; Heather Rae Skeeles, Patient
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groups propose a range of solutions, which run the gamut from absolute protection
of objecting pharmacists from liability to alternative systems of seamless delivery
to a statutory duty to fill all valid prescriptions. Kaplow and Shavell, in promoting
the application of welfare economics, argue that advancing notions of fairness for
policy determinations can actually reduce individuals’ well-being; whereas welfare
economics, by definition, is concerned with the aggregate well-being of
individuals.160
This Article suggests that the courts or policymakers should apply an
economic rationale to analyze pharmacist conscience clauses. Proponents of
conscience clause legislation argue about whether it is fair for a pharmacist to have
to fill prescriptions that may conflict with his or her personal or religious beliefs.
Opponents argue that, for various reasons, it isn’t fair if patients cannot receive
their prescriptions. These arguments, however, fail to address or create a model
that best serves society as a whole—that is, the arguments do not address the
maximization of aggregate social utility.
A. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses Are Part of Tort Law
Legal scholarship in this area applies fairness and value-based arguments to
support or oppose conscience clauses, but what the scholarship does not adequately
address is that conscience clauses are part of tort law. Pharmacists can be held
liable for professional negligence,161 and courts from around the country recognize
pharmacists as having a duty of care towards patients.162
Autonomy Versus Religious Freedom: Should State Legislatures Require Catholic Hospitals to Provide
Emergency Contraception to Rape Victims?, 60 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1007 (2003); Susan Burke Fogel
& Lourdes A. Rivera, The Current State of Abortion Law and Reproductive Rights: Saying Roe is Not
Enough: When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725 (2004); Cicconi, supra note
57; Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Rx for Drugstore Discrimination: Challenging Pharmacy Refusals to
Dispense Prescription Contraceptives Under State Public Accommodations Laws, 70 ALB. L. REV. 55
(2006). See also Brown, supra note 20; Barfield, supra note 52 (stating the South Dakota Right to Life
group pushed for the conscience clause law); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of New Jersey, Fact Sheet:
Emergency
Contraception,
http://www.plannedparenthoodnj.org/library/topic/emergency_contraception/factsheet (last visited Nov.
11, 2010) (“Individual pharmacists have refused to fill prescriptions for ECPs presumably based on the
false assumptions that ECPs are abortifacients.”).
160. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 7, 44.
161. See Cicconi, supra note 57, at 724 (“By imposing liability on pharmacists who erroneously fill
prescriptions, tort law obligates pharmacists to service patients by accurately filling their
prescriptions.”).
162. See McDaniel v. St. Clair, 18 Va. Cir. 470, 473 (1990) (“The duty of the pharmacist is that of a
health care professional and as such is a continuing duty, and the rule of continuing duty should be
applied to pharmacists as it has been applied to other professions noted above”); Downing v. Hyland
Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 948 (Utah 2008) (“A pharmacist owes the consumer a duty of reasonable care
with respect to the sale of drugs not authorized for sale by the FDA or the manufacturer”); Nelms v.
Walgreen Co., No. 02A01-9805-CV-00137, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 437, at *16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 7, 1999) (affirming trial court’s ruling that the evidence supported a claim of ordinary negligence);
Cafarelle v. Brockton Oaks CVS, Inc., No. 94-0414A, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 421, at *8 (Mass. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 1996) (“Because of the dangers involved in the drug business, due care for a pharmacist
requires the highest degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance, and exact and reliable safeguards”);
Clair v. Paris Road Drugs, Inc., 573 So.2d 1219, 1225 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“We also recognize that,
because of the duties attendant to their profession, a high degree of care is placed on pharmacists.”). See

2010]

ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

113

Absent a conscience clause, pharmacists are liable for refusing to fill a
prescription for a non-gatekeeper reason. At issue in Noesen v. State of Wisconsin
Department of Regulation and Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Board,163 for
example, was whether the pharmacist, Noesen, violated the standard of care when
he refused to fill or transfer a prescription.164 In Noesen, patient Renz took her
birth control prescription to K-Mart, where Noesen was the on-duty pharmacist.165
Noesen questioned Renz as to whether she needed the prescription for
“contraceptive purposes.”166 When Renz replied in the affirmative, Noesen advised
her of his objection and refused to fill the prescription.167 Ranz took her empty
prescription package to Wal-Mart and the pharmacist at Wal-Mart called Noesen to
transfer the prescription; Noesen refused.168 Ranz successfully filled her
prescription two days later—but only after missing her first dose.169 Renz filed a
complaint and administrative proceedings were instituted against Noesen.170 The
appellate court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that “Noesen violated the standard
of care applicable to pharmacists when he refused to fill or transfer a patient’s
prescription for an oral contraceptive.”171
Conscience clauses, in providing blanket protection from liability,
acknowledge that pharmacists would otherwise be subject to liability. Arkansas’s
statute, for example, provides: “No such institution, employee, agent, or physician
shall be held liable for the refusal.”172 Likewise, Florida’s statute provides: “The
provisions of this section shall not be interpreted so as to prevent a physician or
other person from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or family planning service,
supplies, or information for medical or religious reasons; and the physician or other
person shall not be held liable for such refusal.”173 As described in detail below,
the conscience clauses effectively create a no-liability regime.
B. Application of Welfare Economics to the Basic Theory of Liability and
Deterrence in a Unilateral Tort Model
Kaplow and Shavell’s scholarship defines how welfare economics applies to

also Dee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 878 So.2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“When a pharmacy
fills a prescription which is unreasonable on its face, even though it is lawful as written, it may breach
this duty of care”); Powers v. Thobani, 903 So.2d 275, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“[F]actual
circumstances exist under which negligence liability can be imposed on a pharmacy for failing to use
due and proper care in filling prescriptions, even if the prescription is filled in accordance with the
physician’s instruction.”).
163. 751 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
164. Id. at 388.
165. Id. at 389.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Noesen, 751 N.W.2d at 389.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 388.
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (West 2010).
173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 2001); see also, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(1) (West
2010).

114

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

tort law.174 The application of welfare economics to evaluate social policy involves
two steps: (1) apply a positive analysis to determine the effects of the policy; and
(2) engage in a normative analysis to determine the policy’s social desirability.175
“The hallmark of welfare economics is that policies are assessed exclusively in
terms of their effects on the well-being of individuals.”176 In promoting the
application of welfare economics over the use of fairness, Kaplow and Shavell
explain:
[A]ny notion of fairness would be subject to our criticism: employing welfare
economics always entails choosing the rule under which everyone is better off than
under each of the alternatives; hence, any deviation from the attempt to enhance
individual’s well-being—in whatever setting—entails the result that everyone
must be worse off. This conclusion is true whether the notion of fairness rests on a
need for compensation, a demand for punishment, a desire to realize corrective
justice, or any other basis. Moreover, this conclusion is true for any mixed view,
under which weight is given both to a notion of fairness and to individuals’ wellbeing; as long as any weight is a notion of fairness, one will sometimes be led to
choose a different legal rule from that under welfare economics, and in every such
177
instance, all individuals will be made worse off.

Thus, welfare economics analyzes the net maximization of social well-being.
In his recent scholarship, Shavell describes the application of welfare
economics to tort law in a unilateral accident model. Shavell’s analysis describes
how to minimize the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident losses,
which equal the total social costs.178 A unilateral accident occurs when only the
injurer’s exercise of care affects the accident risk.179 A close approximation of this
is where an automobile hits a pedestrian; it is unilateral because the pedestrian’s
actions are minor and have almost no effect on reducing risk.180 In this type of
situation, the optimal social welfare occurs where the level of care minimizes the
total social costs.181 The three scenarios under which to discuss the optimal social
welfare in a unilateral accident model are: (1) no-liability; (2) negligence; and (3)
strict liability. A theoretical analysis of the social costs under these three regimes
demonstrates how each scenario affects social welfare.
First, Shavell provides an analysis of the level of due care of the injurer, e.g.,

174. See generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156.
175. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977 (200001) [hereinafter Fairness Versus Welfare]; see also E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 386 (2d ed.
1976) (discussing the use of Pareto improvement in the application of welfare economics: “A Pareto
improvement takes place if some economic rearrangement makes one or more people better off without
making anyone worse off”).
176. Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 175.
177. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 105.
178. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177-99 (2004) [hereinafter
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
179. Id. at 178. See also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(defining what is known as the Learned Hand theory of liability: “[I]f the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B [is less than] PL”).
180. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 178.
181. Id. at 178-79.
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the driver of the automobile, in the unilateral model.182 Under a no liability regime,
injurers will not exercise any level of care because, although there are costs, there
is no benefit to the injurer to exercise care.183 At the other end of the spectrum,
under a strict liability regime, injurers must pay for all accident losses that they
cause.184 Here, the injurers will exercise the level of care that is identical to the
social goal of minimizing total social costs.185 Under a negligence regime, the
injurer will be liable only for accident losses caused by the injurer where the injurer
failed to exercise a level of due care as defined by the courts.186 Thus, the injurer
would not take care above the level of due care as defined by the courts or a statute
because there is no advantage for the injurer to do so.187
Second, Shavell provides an analysis of the level of activity of the injurer in a
unilateral tort model.188 Under a no liability regime, the injurer engages in the
amount of activity that gives them the greatest utility without consideration of the
social costs.189 In a strict liability regime, the injurer will choose the optimal level
of activity because he or she will enjoy the benefits of the activity, but still has to
pay the social costs.190 Under a negligence regime, injurers “will engage in their
activity whenever the utility they derive net of the cost of care is positive.”191 For
social welfare to be maximized, an injurer must choose a level of due care and
select a level of activity that “appropriately balances the utility he obtains against
the additional risks he creates and the costs of care.”192 The law will establish the
standard of care so that the injurer can calculate and appropriately balance his or
her behavior.
Although it appears from the above analysis that strict liability will always
lead to the maximum social welfare in a unilateral situation, this is not always the
case. The defect of the negligence rule, which can lead to excessive activity levels,
must depend on the magnitude of the losses caused by the activity.193 That is, if an
activity is extremely hazardous—such as blasting—then strict liability is
appropriate because of the high risk of harm despite the use of all reasonable
care.194 If, however, the activity creates a low risk of accident losses when
reasonable care is taken, then the importance of excessive activity under a
negligence rule will be minimal.195

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 178-82.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 179-80.
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 180.
Id.
Id. at 193-99
Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id.
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 194.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 197-98; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20 (2010) (defining the application of strict liability).
195. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 197-98.
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C. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses—An Economic Approach
Described below is an argument that pharmacist conscience clauses can be
analyzed under a unilateral tort model.196 To analogize pharmacist conscience
clauses to Shavell’s unilateral tort model: The injurers are the refusing pharmacists
and the victims are the patients who are not able to receive their prescription from
the pharmacist. The refusing pharmacist is the injurer because when an individual
decides to become a pharmacist they know an integral part of that job is to fill valid
prescriptions.197 If a person does not want to fill prescriptions, then they never
have to become a pharmacist.198 The harm only flows from the refusing pharmacist
to the patient when the pharmacist refuses to fill a prescription.
Here, the injurers (i.e., refusing pharmacists) and victims (i.e., patients) are
distinct groups and the well-being of each group may be different.199 These two
groups will have different preferences—the pharmacists may prefer a rule of no
liability,200 whereas the victims may prefer a rule of strict liability.201 The
economic goal is to maximize social utility. Under this model, what is gained by
the patients is lost by the pharmacists who would choose the liability protection for
refusing to fill prescriptions.202
196. This Article descriptively applies welfare economics to pharmacist conscience clauses in a
unilateral tort model to demonstrate how welfare economics can be applied to the debate. The Author
acknowledges that other models may be utilized to analyze pharmacist conscience clauses through the
use of welfare economics. The purpose here, however, is to demonstrate that an economic approach—
as opposed to fairness arguments—offers an attractive alternative to the current debate.
197. See Cicconi, supra note 57, at 723. Cf. Harrington, supra note 40, at 804-09 (discussing
whether there is a duty of the pharmacist to dispense medication).
198. This Article does not fully consider whether this may raise an autonomy issue. Instead, this
Article views the decision not to become a pharmacist as equal to reasons why many people do not enter
certain professions. For example, some groups are opposed to blood transfusions; thus, one may suspect
that people in these groups do not become surgeons. The main point is that individuals know, ex ante,
requirements for certain professions. If an individual does not or cannot satisfy the basic requirements
of a profession, then that individual knows that they should consider a different profession.
199. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 118.
200. Indeed, not all pharmacists will prefer this as many pharmacists may be against conscience
clause legislation. Another point where there is room for debate, is whether a pharmacist’s preference to
refuse to fill prescriptions could be considered an objectively bad preference and therefore the
preference will have no value in an economic calculation. For example, in NEW FOUNDATIONS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, Matthew Alder and Eric Posner provide an example of an objectively bad
preference (here, a preference that “homosexuals not be helped through AIDS research”) that would
most likely not be considered by an agency applying a cost-benefit analysis. MATTHEW ALDER & ERIC
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 129-30 (2006). Similarly, under conscience
clause legislation, a pharmacist may escape liability for refusing to fill a prescription for HIV
medications because the pharmacist is personally opposed to helping homosexuals. Thus, a debate
about determining a value to assign to the objecting pharmacist’s preferences should consider the above
when applying a normative economic approach to conscience clause legislation. See id. at 139 (“We
could imagine, for example, guidelines holding that preferences that are based on animus against racial
minorities, women, and homosexuals would not be counted.”).
201. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 118.
202. Again, an argument could be that the objecting pharmacist’s preference should not be
considered or given a low value. For example, if the analysis determines that a preference against, for
example, people who oppose medication for persons infected with HIV is due to opposition to
homosexuality and is considered an objectively bad preference, then this preference may be assigned a
value of $0. Or, perhaps, if a preference is not considered objectively bad, then the analysis could focus

2010]

ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

117

Pharmacist conscience clauses operate to shield a refusing pharmacist from
any and all liability should the pharmacist refuse to fill a prescription due to a
personal or religious belief. These clauses can be descriptively analogized to the
no care standard described above in the unilateral driving model. Under the
pharmacist conscience clause regime, a refusing pharmacist will not exercise any
level of care because there is no benefit to the injurer in doing so, even though
there would be costs to the patient. Further, under the pharmacist conscience
clause regime, a refusing pharmacist will engage in the amount of activity that
gives them the greatest utility without any consideration of the social costs, such as
failure to give a patient a time-sensitive prescription. “[A] regime of no liability,
one that does not satisfy the notions of fairness that we consider, will be best for all
individuals when liability does not influence precautions and is costly to
administer.”203 Here, pharmacist conscience clauses are not best for individuals’
well-being because liability does influence precautions. Under the no liability
regime of a pharmacist conscience clause, the refusing pharmacist will not take any
precautions to fill prescriptions that are against their religious beliefs, regardless of
the cost to the patients, harm will occur, and the patients will bear the costs.204
Upon the theoretical demonstration that pharmacist conscience clauses can be
analogized to a no-care regime, and may not maximize the well-being of
individuals, the question becomes whether pharmacists should be held liable under
negligence or strict liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription.205
Strict liability is most likely not the appropriate measure for the injurer’s
liability with respect to pharmacist conscience clauses because this is not a
situation where substantial risk is created despite the exercise of due care.206 Strict
liability is traditionally reserved for those activities—such as blasting—that cannot
be made safe with any reasonable exercise of due care and the activity can be
classified as one not of common usage.207 An appropriate level of due care—i.e.,
liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription based on the pharmacist’s religious
beliefs—can be assigned to support a negligence regime. That is, a court can
establish a standard of due care that considers the gatekeeper functions of the
on the costs associated with the affected person in obtaining the medication versus delaying or
prohibiting obtaining the medication. See ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 140 (describing how to
handle objectively bad preferences in cost-benefit analysis). In their book, Adler and Posner
acknowledge the potential problems with monetizing the costs and benefits of regulations given parties’
preferences. Id. at 149.
203. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 105 (footnote omitted).
204. Cf. id. at 102 (discussing a regime of no liability in a reciprocal accident paradigm).
205. The Author acknowledges that a stylistic model was applied for this determination. That is, that
the failure of the patient to receive the medication is the main variable used to analyze the individual’s
well-being. This restrictive assumption, however, allows for a simple model and is helpful to illustrate
the problems associated with conscience clauses. See id. at 32 n.33. Further, this Article does not
consider the distributional effect of moving money from the injurer to the victim as a variable that
should influence the analysis. See FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at
654-55 (explaining why “legal rules should generally not be chosen on the basis of their distributional
effects”). This model assumes that the cost of precaution is lower than the cost associated with inducing
the injurer to take care. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 102-03.
206. See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 202.
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20
(2010) (defining elements of abnormally dangerous activity).

118

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

pharmacist. Pharmacists can exercise the due care to meet the professional
standards of their gatekeeper medical functions.
The negligence rule for pharmacists may be favored under welfare economics
because a level of due care can be established that maximizes social welfare. The
professional standard of care can be established by reference to a national standard
or the state licensing provisions.
If the level of care is established by statute or regulation, state licensing boards
can utilize an economic analysis to establish the standard of care that will be
applied by the courts. Factors to be considered in the analysis to establish the
professional standard of care in order to minimize social costs include: the
likelihood of harm, the probable extent of harm, the number of individuals at risk,
and the ease in which those causing injury can alleviate risk.208 That is, the state
licensing board can consider the above analysis and factors when establishing the
requirements of professional conduct. This is important because some state
licensing provisions are vague and may not effectively guide a court. For example,
the statute governing pharmacists in Kansas provides: “Nothing in this section shall
be construed as preventing a pharmacist from refusing to fill or refill any
prescription if in the pharmacist’s professional judgment and discretion such
pharmacist is of the opinion that it should not be filled or refilled.”209 Under the
Kansas provision, a court would likely have a difficult time discerning the standard
of care for determining when it is reasonable for a pharmacist to refuse to fill a
prescription. The statute is not clear as to what is encompassed within
“professional judgment and discretion.” Pharmacists, as professionals, are trained
in pharmacology. As long as the drug does not pose any pharmacological risk to
the health and safety of the patient, then should anything other than professional
judgment be considered? State policymakers can apply welfare economics to
define professional conduct in such a way that a court can apply the specific
standard of care to a pharmacist who is facing a claim of professional negligence.
Alternatively, it may be that state licensing boards prefer to have matters regarding
professional conduct adjudicated in administrative proceedings, with review by
appellate courts.210 In either case, the state licensing board can apply welfare
economics to define professional and unprofessional conduct.211
Another dimension to consider is whether the victims could or should exercise
any level of care. If a patient receives a prescription from their physician and
travels to a pharmacy to fill it, it does not seem as though the victim can adjust their
behavior to avoid accident losses. Here, the pharmacists and pharmacies are in the

208. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 191 (discussing
determination of due care).
209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1637 (2009).
210. See, e.g., Noesen, 751 N.W.2d 385; cf. ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 2 (“To simplify
greatly, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires the regulatory agency to sum up the costs and benefits of a
proposed regulation, and issue the regulation if the benefits exceed the costs.”).
211. It is unclear whether it is more cost effective to have the courts perform analyses based on the
facts in front of them or to have each state conduct a cost benefit analysis when determining the state
licensing regulations. A full scale cost-benefit analysis may be too expensive for a state to consider
because at some point it becomes so expensive there are diminishing returns. ALDER & POSNER, supra
note 200, at 109.
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best—if not the only—position to avoid the losses.212 The injurers are the only
party that can take the precaution to fill all valid and legal prescriptions in order to
minimize total social costs.213
Under the above analysis, the application of welfare economics demonstrates
that negligence is the appropriate regime. Another advantage to the application of
welfare economics to analyze conscience clause legislation is transparency in
decision-making.214 Liability for refusal to fill valid prescriptions allows the
pharmacists to know, ex ante, the consequences of not serving as a gatekeeper and
refusing to fill the prescription due to religious or personal beliefs.215
The theoretical model outlined above demonstrates that pharmacist conscience
clauses create a no-liability regime that fails to maximize individuals’ wellbeing.216 An empirical model could be created to predict the economic costs
resulting from conscience clause legislation. Rural communities, for example, may
have high costs associated with a pharmacist’s refusal to fill a prescription. Low
income persons in rural communities may not have access to transportation or the
ability to take time away from work to travel to neighboring communities to fill
prescriptions.217 Notably, it is states such as South Dakota and Mississippi—with
higher percentages of low income and rural communities—that have conscience
clause legislation.218 The 2000 Census data shows that both South Dakota and
Mississippi are largely rural states.219 A recent government survey looking at stateby-state poverty levels calculates that 13.9% of citizens in South Dakota are under
the poverty level and 19.9% of citizens in Mississippi are below the poverty
level.220 Citizens in these states will potentially face a higher degree of difficulty
when attempting to fill prescriptions initially refused by their local pharmacist.
By assigning values in the economic calculus, and employing the economic
tests of Pareto improvement or Kalder-Hicks, conscience clause legislation can be
evaluated to determine if it maximizes individuals’ well-being as compared to an
absence of such legislation. A potential Pareto improvement can be obtained
212. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 189.
213. Id. Social costs are defined as the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident losses. Id.
at 177-99.
214. See, e.g., ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 135 (“CBA enhances transparency by forcing
agencies to use a common metric for justifying their decisions.”).
215. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 49 (“[N]otions of fairness often ignore important
aspects of ex ante behavior.”).
216. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 663; see also MISHAN,
supra note 175, at 412-13 (maintaining that cost-benefit analysis is a useful technique for determinations
of social policy, although it has certain limitations).
217. Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1349-50.
218. Teliska, supra note 32, at 241 (looking at the legislative trend in pharmacist refusal clauses in
South Dakota).
219. Id. at 244-46 (discussing the results of the 2000 Census); see also U.S. Census Bureau, State
and County Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28000.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010)
(for census information).
220. U.S. Census Bureau, Percent of People Below Poverty Level in the Past 12 Months (For Whom
Poverty
Status
is
Determined):
2008,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/Thematic
MapFramesetServlet?_ bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-tm_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_M00601&-ds_
name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_&-_MapEvent=displayBy&-_dBy=040&-_lang=en&-_sse=on
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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where the “gains can be so distributed as to make everyone in the community better
off.”221 Some law and economics scholars refer to the potential Pareto
improvement as the Kalder-Hicks test, which relaxes the rigor of the strict Pareto
test by analyzing whether the benefits gained from a particular project or regulation
are enough that they can compensate the losers and still have some left over for
themselves—although no actual compensation is required.222
In sum, the theoretical application of welfare economics to the protection from
liability under the conscience clause—which is analogous to a no-duty regime
under tort law—does not appear to be supported by the normative economic
approach of welfare economics due to a failure to maximize individuals’ wellbeing.
D. A Pre-Emptive Response to Deontological Concerns
In brief, this section addresses potential critiques of the application of welfare
economics to resolve the pharmacist conscience clause issue. Some legal scholars
question the application of economic analysis to policy questions that arguably
contain moral factors or moral evaluations.223 In their scholarship, Eyal Zamir and
Barak Medina explain:
[D]eontological theories view the goodness of outcomes as a morally relevant
factor, but not as the only inherently important one . . . . They contain constraints
on attaining the best outcomes and at the same time allow people to (sometimes)
pursue their own interests and the interests of people dear to them or belonging to
224
their group, even if such a pursuit conflicts with attaining the overall good.

Scholarship in this area analyzes the conflict between economic efficiency analysis,
which looks to individuals’ well-being, and deontological analysis, which
maintains that an individual’s interest should be pursued even if it conflicts with
obtaining the overall maximization of social welfare.225
Applied to pharmacist conscience clauses, a deontological argument could be
that a refusing pharmacist’s religious views that birth control or drugs developed
through stem-cell research are morally wrong and that no dollar or utility value can
or should be applied to this personal viewpoint in order to conduct an economic
221. See MISHAN, supra note 175, at 386, 390; see also ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 6:
Our argument is that CBA is best defended as a welfarist decision procedure. Costbenefit analysis is justified as a decision procedure to the extent that it advances overall
well-being—that is, the well-being of the public generally, if not necessarily every
member of the public—relative to alternative decision procedures, including the null case
of doing nothing.
Id.
222. ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 10-11, 22.
223. See Richard S. Markovits, On the Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 26-34 (2001) (arguing deficiencies of the application of economic-efficiency analysis);
Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with
Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329-43 (2008) (critiquing consequentialism).
224. Zamir & Medina, supra note 223, at 343.
225. A large body of scholarship addresses the conflict between consequentialism and deontology.
This debate is beyond the scope of this Article. This section of the Article is meant to show that a strict
application of deontology does not necessarily negate the promotion of a negligence regime. Further,
welfare economics can consider the preferences of pharmacists.
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analysis. One response to this argument is that the application of welfare
economics to determine whether pharmacist conscience clauses maximize
individuals’ well-being does not violate an individual’s religious beliefs. Any adult
who is opposed to birth control or drugs developed through stem cell research is
not required to take the medication. That is, the application of welfare economics
to pharmacist conscience clauses does not violate an individual’s autonomy with
respect to his or her personal feelings and values associated with these drugs. If a
person is opposed to these types of drugs, he or she does not have to take the
medication. Thus, the individual who is opposed to certain drugs can act in a way
that maintains his or her moral integrity by choosing not to become a pharmacist
and not to take certain drugs.226 In this way, an objecting person’s autonomy is
preserved.227 The preservation of autonomy, however, does not give an individual
the right to impose his or her religious beliefs onto someone else.
Further, the decision to become a pharmacist is volitional. There is no
requirement that any individual has to become a pharmacist. Ex ante, a person
considering whether to become a pharmacist knows that part of the profession is
dispensing FDA-approved drugs. Society could not function if every profession
allowed exemptions for any and all moral beliefs. 228 As an analogy, it would be
difficult to allow exemptions for a surgical resident, who is also a Jehovah’s
Witness, which allow the resident to refuse to provide a patient with a needed
blood transfusion due to the resident’s personal or religious beliefs.229 It is unlikely

226. See, e.g., Zamir & Medina, supra note 223, at 344 (“While consequentialism judges acts
according to whether they bring about the best state of affairs, deontology judges acts according to
whether the actors conduct themselves in ways that maintain their moral integrity.”).
227. Some may argue that the autonomy of the pharmacist is restricted, for example, even if it is in
choosing a profession. The Author thanks a colleague for raising this important issue. However, this
problem can be addressed in a cost benefit analysis. To make an analogy, restrictions on places where
persons are allowed to smoke affect a smoker’s autonomy and ability to enjoy smoking. For a nonsmoker, however, the restrictions on smoking may increase their enjoyment. As described in E.J.
Misham’s treatise on cost-benefit analysis, the smoker and non-smoker are not on equal footing: “In
accordance with the liberal maxim, the freedom of any man, say, to smoke what he wants and where he
wants is conceded-but along with the critical proviso that his smoking take place in circumstances which
do not reduce the welfare of others.” MISHAN, supra note 175, at 447. This rationale can be applied to
pharmacist conscience clauses. One argument could be that even if the autonomy of choosing a
profession is restricted because a pharmacist can be held liable for refusing to fill a prescription for a
non-medical reason, the refusing pharmacist is not on equal footing with the patient that is refused their
prescription because there is a reduction in the welfare of the patients.
228. Zamir & Medina, supra note 223, at 347. Zamir and Medina discuss the consequentialist
response to the application of moderate deontology to personal moral theory versus the application to
legal policymakers:
[I]t has been argued that the distinctions central to at least some versions of deontology,
such as the doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing, are not relevant in the public sphere.
This is because, unlike a private person, the state bears responsibility for the well-being
of all, and because the motivations for collective and institutional decisions are often
unclear and even conflicting.
Id. Zamir and Medina, however, do not support this argument. See id.
229. Jehovah’s Witnesses, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jehovah’s_Witnesses (last visited
Aug. 27, 2010) (“Jehovah’s Witnesses are best known for their door-to-door preaching, distribution of
literature such as The Watchtower and Awake!, and for their refusal of military service and blood
transfusions even in life-threatening situations.”). See also Jehovah’s Witness, ENCYCLOPEDIA
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that a hospital or residency program would be required to accommodate the
refusing resident’s personal beliefs about blood transfusions. Indeed, this
hypothetical supports the application of Title VII to employers such that employers
are only required to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs so long as the
accommodation is de minimis. Further, religious beliefs do not trump all other
considerations. In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court has stated that states
must adopt laws with a secular purpose.230
Deontological concerns may address the following problem. Suppose a smalltown pharmacist, who is opposed to stem cell research, refuses to fill any
prescriptions for a new medication for diabetes because the drug was developed
through stem cell research. On the other hand, suppose 100 patients in this same
small town are not able to obtain their diabetes medication. This scenario creates a
deontological constraint. Whose moral position is more important? The
pharmacist who doesn’t want to fill the prescription or the patients who suffer—
and maybe even die—because they cannot receive their medication?231 Even if it is
just one patient who cannot receive his or her medication, who is in a worse
position—the patient or the pharmacist? Welfare economics can address this
problem, to some extent, because the preferences of each side can be included in
the calculation.232
A final note on this Article’s brief response to potential philosophical concerns
is that the law seeks to obtain practical results.233 It is not that the religious
concerns of the refusing pharmacists shouldn’t be acknowledged, it’s that the
preferences of the pharmacists who want legal protection from liability for refusing
to fill prescriptions should not bootstrap lawmakers and judges in cases where a
refusing pharmacist interferes with a patient’s right to FDA-approved
medications.234 Individuals’ religious rights are protected under the First
Amendment, but this does not mean the law must conform to every religious
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/302393/Jehovahs-Witness (last visited Nov.
11, 2010).
230. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (defining elements of the Lemon Test and
reviewing Establishment Clause jurisprudence). Another argument, as discussed previously in Part
V.C., could be made that the objecting pharmacist’s preference is an objectively bad preference.
231. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simmons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV.
273, 292 n.68 (1996) (criticizing consequentialist arguments, but acknowledging potential deontological
constraints).
232. Cf. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 156-57 (addressing deontological criticisms of costbenefit analysis and conceding that cost-benefit analysis does not track deontological values. The
authors state that cost-benefit analysis “is not a superprocedure” and that deontological “considerations
(to the extent they exist) need to be brought to bear on agency choice through decision rules other than
[cost-benefit analysis]”).
One way to calculate the pharmacist’s preference is to utilize the marginal value of the
preference. That is, the first time a pharmacist refuses may have one value, but the second, third, etc.
time may have less value. The Author thanks a colleague for suggesting the use of marginal value to
calculate the pharmacist’s preference.
233. See Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner’s and Rorty’s
Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 104-05 (1996) (discussing
the difference between philosophy and law and stating that the law “must aim for workable solutions
that make a real difference in the empirical world”). Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC
CHOICES 86-87 (1978) (discussing the application of nonmarket mechanisms to tragic choices).
234. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 233, at 111 (describing Posner’s approach to pragmatism).
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thought of any individual.235 According to the theoretical application of welfare
economics as described above, a negligence regime maximizes individuals’ wellbeing.236 As professionals—whether a doctor or a pharmacist—the best interest of
the health and safety of the patient, according to standard medical practices, should
be followed.
E. Current Alternative Proposals Do Not Maximize Individuals’ Well-Being
As discussed in Part V, Section C, the common law, or state licensing
provisions, can establish that the standard of care for pharmacists is to fill all valid
and legal prescriptions—that is, the level of care is defined by the gatekeeper
functions of the profession. A court may decide that the refusal to fill a
prescription for religious reasons fails to meet the standard of care and hold a
pharmacist liable for this refusal. Put differently, a pharmacist would fail to meet
the professional standard of care should a pharmacist refuse to fill a prescription for
any non-medical reason. The common law approach to tort liability should
accomplish the goal of maximizing individuals’ well-being in light of this standard.
Other proposals, as described below, promote alternative approaches to ensure
that patients receive their prescription drugs. These proposals, however, contain
certain practical problems that potentially make them less ideal than the common
law negligence approach.
1. Seamless Delivery
One proposed policy is to place the burden on the pharmacy to require
seamless delivery of all medications without the patient knowing that a particular
pharmacist personally objects to use of the drug.237 Described as ‘stepping away’
rather than ‘stepping in the way,’ this policy requires that a pharmacy establish a
system where at least one pharmacist is on duty at all times who will fill all
prescriptions.238 A recent bill proposed in Pennsylvania would place the onus on
pharmacies to ensure the seamless delivery of stocked drugs.239 California enacted

235. Cf. id.
236. This Article does not propose that an economic approach to any question of law will always be
correct. It is possible and conceivable that an economic approach will have a result that is diametrically
opposed to the preservation of certain rights. Arguably, any approach to law has limitations. Cf. id. at
122 (describing Posner’s approach as looking to “the United States Constitution to curtail the most
objectionable political redistributions and to rule out the most ethically reprehensible uses of wealthmaximization in common law adjudication”).
237. Smearman, supra note 26, at 538 (“By requiring each pharmacy, rather than each pharmacist, to
dispense the contraceptives, the regulation leaves room for the pharmacy to adopt procedures to
accommodate an individual pharmacist who wishes to step aside when another pharmacist is available to
fill the prescription.”).
238. Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus.,
109th Cong. 11-12 (2005) (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, Clinical Assistant Professor of
Pharmacotherapy, Washington State University). See also Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4, at
1558 (proposing solutions); Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1348 (discussing so-called transfer
provisions).
239. Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.B. 2217, 189th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2005); Access to
Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, S 1089 (Pa. 2006).
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a statute addressing seamless delivery.240 Likewise, legislation aimed at ensuring
all valid prescriptions are filled by the pharmacy, as opposed to the pharmacist, has
been introduced at the federal level.241 These pieces of legislation attempt to adopt
a middle ground whereby a prescription would be filled without delay and a patient
would never know that a particular pharmacist may personally object to dispensing
the medication.
At first glance, this appears to be a suitable compromise to all sides. Notions
of fairness are satisfied: a pharmacist retains the right of refusing to dispense, yet
the patient still receives the medication. In practice, however, seamless delivery is
problematic.242 First, it assumes that all pharmacies, including rural ones, will
financially be able to support having multiple pharmacists on duty, if needed.
Second, a pharmacy could decide that it only wants to have one pharmacist on duty
at any given time and will therefore only hire a pharmacist who will fill all
prescriptions. Potentially, a pharmacist with religious objections could argue that
this constitutes religious discrimination—albeit this is probably a weak
argument.243 Third, logistical problems exist. For example, the pharmacist that
will fill all prescriptions may be sick one day, or may need time away for personal
reasons. Under this scenario, any particular pharmacy would need multiple backup pharmacists to ensure the seamless delivery of drugs. Fourth, a pharmacy may
determine that the requirement to always have one pharmacist on duty that will fill
all prescriptions is too onerous and simply decide not to stock the controversial
medications. For example, albeit under different circumstances, Wal-Mart decided
not to carry EC.244 Wal-Mart ultimately changed its policy, after pressure by state
officials to sell EC.245 No reason exists, however, not to believe that other
pharmacies—particularly independent pharmacies in small towns—would opt to
avoid the conflict altogether and refuse to carry certain drugs. Fifth, seamless
delivery may be a particularly difficult solution in states that have laws giving
pharmacists the legal authority to prescribe and dispense EC.246 In these scenarios,
patients are interviewed and counseled by a pharmacist. If the pharmacist agrees
the patient meets the clinical criteria for EC, the pharmacist can write and fill the

240. Cicconi, supra note 57, at 710 (describing California law).
241. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. §2(a) (2005). See also
Cicconi, supra note 57, at 720 (2007) (describing the proposed federal legislation).
242. See, e.g., Smearman, supra note 26, at 537 (footnote omitted) (“While the policy of ‘referrals
and seamless access’ adopted in the APhA refusal clause has facial appeal, in practice it has proved
impracticable because community pharmacists often work alone.”).
243. Herbe, supra note 17, at 93-94 (discussing how a plaintiff would be unlikely to overcome the
defense of undue burden required in order to make a religious discrimination claim under Title VII of
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964).
244. John Maniaci, Editorial, Wal-Mart’s Phony Morality, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 11, 1999, at 19.
245. Michael Barbaro, In Reversal, Wal-Mart Will Sell Contraceptive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at
C4.
246. Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus.,
109th Cong. 11-12 (2005) [hereinafter Freedom of Conscience Hearings] (statement of Linda Garrelts
MacLean, Clinical Assistant Professor of Pharmacotherapy, Washington State University). Professor
MacLean stated that Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Washington
allow pharmacists to prescribe EC and that in 2005 similar legislation was introduced in Illinois,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont. Id.

2010]

ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

125

prescription.247 This system is an important step forward for women who need EC
because of the time-sensitivity of effectiveness of the medication. It also, however,
expands the role of the pharmacist and potentially increases all the burdens
discussed above on a pharmacy to ensure that a pharmacist is on duty at all times to
prescribe and dispense all medications.
Seamless delivery also feeds into the problem associated with expansion of
conscience clauses as applied to drugs developed through controversial biomedical
research. Some pharmacists may not be willing to fill prescriptions for assisted
suicide, while others object to birth control, while others in the future may object to
newly discovered drugs developed through stem cell research. Pharmacies may
end up in a quagmire and find it too difficult to have pharmacists on duty at all
times to dispense drugs for all medications. This makes the decision not to carry
controversial medications a more attractive choice for these pharmacies.
The seamless delivery proposal exemplifies where a policy decision solely
consisting of notions of fairness does not necessarily maximize individuals’ wellbeing. Upon an examination of the potential practical problems that can be
encountered with a system of seamless delivery, it appears that the patients
continue to be the injured party and the refusing pharmacists continue as the
injuring party, resembling the problems associated with a no-liability regime as
described above.
Welfare economics would not support seamless delivery because it reduces
individuals’ well-being. That is, proponents of seamless delivery consider the
preferences of the pharmacist who does not want to face liability for refusing to fill
a prescription. The objecting pharmacist’s preference, however, has a detrimental
impact on the well-being of the patients who will have de facto difficulty in filling
prescriptions, as described above.248 Thus, the aggregate benefit to social welfare
of having prescriptions filled will greatly exceed any gain to the refusing
pharmacist.249 In sum, the practical problems with seamless delivery mimic the noliability regime of conscience clauses—a policy that is not supported by welfare
economics.
2. Duty-to-Fill Legislation
Duty-to-fill legislation requires all pharmacies and pharmacists to dispense
legal prescriptions.250 This type of legislation allows the pharmacists to know, ex
ante, the potential consequences of their actions should they refuse to fill a
prescription due to personal or religious beliefs.251 That is, the duty-to-fill
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 427:
[A] complete welfare economic analysis of many of the preferences that are generally
believed to be objectionable will not ordinarily lead one to favor policies that satisfy such
preferences. The reason is that the detrimental effects of so doing—reductions in other
individuals’ well-being and often, in the long run, the well-being of those with the
objectionable preferences—will tend to outweigh the benefits of satisfying such
preferences.
249. Id. at 429.
250. See Freedom of Conscience Hearings, supra note 248.
251. KAPLAW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 49.
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legislation allows the pharmacists to select the level of care to take—knowing the
consequences of their actions.252
Although the application of welfare economics in the above theoretical model
demonstrates that a common law negligence regime can maximize individuals’
well-being, some states have reacted to the idea that a pharmacist may escape
liability for refusing to fill prescriptions by enacting rules that statutorily establish
liability for refusing pharmacists. Under the theoretical model of pharmacist
liability as proposed in this Article, statutory duty-to-fill legislation is not needed
unless: (1) the states refuse to repeal already enacted pharmacist conscience clause
legislation; (2) the states continue to enact conscience clause legislation; or (3) the
courts or state licensing boards do not want to apply welfare economics to
determine the standard of care.253 In any event, a discussion of duty-to-fill
legislation is warranted in consideration of the existence any of the above
scenarios.
As mentioned earlier, some states have duty-to-fill rules. Illinois, for example,
issued an emergency duty-to-fill rule after a pharmacist in downtown Chicago
refused to fill a prescription for a contraceptive.254 The Governor stated that “[o]ur
regulation says that if a woman goes to a pharmacy with a prescription for birth
control, the pharmacy is not allowed to discriminate against who they sell it to and
who they don’t . . . . No delays. No hassles. No lectures. Just fill the
prescription.”255 Specifically, the Governor said he was taking a stand against a
growing trend of anti-choice pharmacists.256 This policy is a way to ensure that all
legal prescriptions are filled;257 however, it does not require the pharmacy to carry
the medication at issue.
Opponents of duty-to-fill legislation argue that it turns pharmacists into robots
that are required to fill all prescriptions, without respect to their gatekeeper
function.258 They argue that pharmacists would have to fill all legal prescriptions

252. Id. (“Accordingly, ex ante behavior, all of its possible outcomes, and the potential effects of
legal rules thereon are central features that are examined under welfare economic analysis”).
253. Perhaps duty-to-fill legislation, or similar legislation that grants regulatory authority in the same
vein, would satisfy the philosophical concerns raised in Part V, Section D. Scholarship in the area notes
that an economic approach to law may be in friction with an automatic wealth-maximizing outcome. In
these cases, policymakers may turn to regulations. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 233, at 118,
observing:
In practice, however, one cannot remain within the frictionless world of perfect markets
in which law is merely facilitative and where outcomes are automatically wealthmaximizing. Instead, frictions are inevitable, littering the path to wealth-maximization
with serious obstacles, making it necessary to appeal to regulative law, and raising for the
first time significant questions concerning distributive justice.
Duty-to-fill legislation or a related regulation is similar to a “rule-utilitarianism” approach. See also
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 86-87 (1973) (discussing the application of
nonmarket mechanisms).
254. Pallasch, supra note 62 (“Gov. Blagojevich issued an emergency rule Friday compelling
pharmacists to dispense contraceptives even if they believe the drugs kill the unborn.”).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1350-55 (recommending “duty to dispense” laws).
258. Freedom of Conscience Hearings, supra note 248. (“If the pharmacist’s role were merely to
dispense lawfully prescribed medicines, that robot or automation would fit the bill.”).
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without delay regardless of whether the pharmacist detects potential allergies or
adverse drug-related interactions.259 This argument in opposition to duty-to-fill
legislation is a red herring. It does not impact the importance of applying
pharmacological knowledge of drug allergies and interactions. Indeed, as these
concerns were presented to the Illinois Governor and the Illinois Department of
Financial and Professional Regulation, they issued a clarification statement that the
duty-to-fill rule was not to interfere with a pharmacist’s responsibility to conduct a
utilization review.260
The language of duty-to-fill legislation can easily be drafted to ensure the
gatekeeper function of a pharmacist is not compromised. The Pharmacy Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, introduced in the Federal Senate, for example, directly
addresses the obligation to fill valid prescriptions, while protecting the gatekeeper
function:
The pharmacy ensures that each valid prescription is filled with unnecessary delay
or other interference, consistent with the normal timeframe for filling prescriptions
[and] . . . [n]othing in this section shall prohibit a pharmacy from refusing to
dispense a prescribed item, in accordance with standard pharmacy practice, if there
is a valid medical concern that such prescribed item will cause problems due to
therapeutic duplications, drug-disease contraindications, drug interactions
(including serious interactions with prescription or over-the-counter medications),
incorrect dosage or duration of drug treatment, drug-allergy interactions, or drug
abuse or misuse. Any refusal to dispense a prescribed item must be based on
261
generally accepted practice among health care providers.

In this way, the professional gatekeeper function is protected and the patient
receives the prescribed medication.262
If, however, states refuse to repeal pharmacist conscience clause legislation
and continue to pass pharmacist conscience clause legislation, the federal
government may need to enact duty-to-fill legislation to pre-empt state behavior.
That is, the state conscience clause legislation will carve out an exception to the
common law approach of the application of a professional standard of care. If this
is the case, then the current duty-to-fill legislation proposed at the federal level
should contain additional safeguards.
Although a step in the right direction, duty-to-fill legislation must place an
obligation on a pharmacy to carry any controversial medication. The duty-to-fill
legislation proposed in the Federal Senate, for example, includes a provision that
the pharmacy must ensure that it orders an item that is not in stock or transfer the
prescription.263 Any duty-to-fill legislation, however, should include language that
a pharmacy cannot refuse to stock or order drugs due to any personal or religious
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. §§ 2(a), (c) (2005). This
legislation places the burden on the pharmacy and it may face similar practical problems as discussed
with seamless delivery in Part V.E.1.
262. Cf. Smearman, supra note 26, at 510-11 (discussing why the duty to warn has not shifted from
physician to pharmacist and stating that “[c]ourts addressing this issue emphasize that pharmacists are
not qualified to evaluate the soundness of a physician’s choice of a drug regimen for a patient”).
263. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. §2(a) (2005).
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beliefs. This proposed addition maximizes individuals’ well being because the
pharmacies could also be the injuring party.
This is an important point because Catholic hospitals are the largest group of
non-profit hospitals and are often the only hospital in rural areas.264 Many Catholic
hospitals adhere to religious doctrines when establishing policies, including
performing abortions or providing EC to rape victims.265 A study of Catholic
hospitals showed that only 28% provided EC to rape victims.266 This is an
alarming statistic considering the American Medical Association considers EC to
be standard care for a rape victim.267 By amending any duty-to-fill legislation to
set the standard of care to include a requirement that a pharmacy must stock or
order all FDA approved medications, both the pharmacy and the pharmacist can
face liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription due to any non-medical reason.
Further, any duty-to-fill legislation should include a private cause of action.268
If the states continue to adopt, enact and/or enforce pharmacist conscience clause
legislation, then the federal government will need to enact duty-to-fill legislation to
pre-empt state behavior. In this way, both the government and the citizens can
monitor the proper enforcement of this legislation.
In some respects, a pharmacist conscience clause that stops any patient—male
or female—from filling a prescription exemplifies and amplifies that patients are
injured by this legislation. To date it is women who are overwhelmingly affected
by conscience clause legislation because it is women who fill prescriptions for
contraceptives and EC.269 Historically, women gained equal rights through the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.270 Once men are refused prescriptions
for diabetes, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and heart disease, the debate surrounding
conscience clause legislation will raise issues that are no longer based on
reproductive rights, women’s rights, or only affect a subset of the population.
These types of difficulties can be included in the normative application of welfare
264. Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at 137 (describing the expansion of Catholic hospitals); Skeeles,
supra note 155, at 1011 (“Catholic hospitals constitute the largest group of health care providers in the
United States”); Smearman, supra note 26, at 485.
265. Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at 138 (describing how hospitals follow religious doctrine when
instituting policies); Fogel & Rivera, supra note 159, at 740-41 (describing how a broad range of
services are unavailable at religious hospitals).
266. Weiss, supra note 18, at 4 (describing the study of rape victims’ access to EC in emergency
rooms).
267. American Medical Association, ACCESS TO EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 27 (2008), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org//ama1/pub/upload/mm/386/vio_policy_comp.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2010).
268. The Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005) contains a private
cause of action. The findings for this legislation, however, could potentially be limited to contraception.
A bill that is passed should include all FDA approved medications and contain a private cause of action
for an aggrieved individual.
269. Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1347 (“Likewise, one hundred percent of the patients directly
affected by pharmacist refusal clauses are women.”). See also Vokes, supra note 16, at 402-03 (2006)
(“Nearly one third of all women in the United States who use some sort of contraception method are on
birth control pills; over eleven million women use birth control as their regular method of
contraception.”).
270. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsberg and
WRP Staff, (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/24412pub20060307.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010).
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economics.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ramifications of conscience clause legislation run far beyond the number
of instances of refusals to fill prescriptions or the desire to accommodate
pharmacists who are personally against specific medications. This type of
legislation could be expanded to many other drugs and areas of research and it does
not have a net benefit to social welfare.
An analysis of pharmacist conscience clauses is particularly ripe at this time as
the Obama Administration recently announced its support for the federal funding of
embryonic stem cell research. Expansive pharmacist conscience clause legislation
could protect pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for drugs developed
through stem cell research.
Legal scholarship in this area debates the fairness of conscience clauses. The
debate appears to be at an impasse and is, in any event, unsatisfying. This Article
proposes the application of welfare economics as the guiding principle in policy
determinations and presents an alternative approach to the current debate
surrounding pharmacist conscience clauses.
The theoretical application of welfare economics demonstrates that pharmacist
conscience clause legislation may not maximize individuals’ well-being. A
common law approach, whereby a pharmacist may be held liable for refusing to fill
a prescription for a non-medical reason, most likely can reach the appropriate
balance to minimize total social costs. If however, states refuse to repeal
pharmacist conscience clause legislation or states continue to pass pharmacist
conscience clause legislation, duty-to-fill legislation, which places a statutory duty
on pharmacies or pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions, may be needed. If this is
the case, duty-to-fill legislation should include a provision that pharmacies cannot
refuse to carry any FDA approved medication due to any religious or personal
objections.
Importantly, duty-to-fill legislation does not alter any of the professional
responsibilities and gatekeeper functions of a pharmacist. The pharmacist’s job to
ensure the prescription is valid and legal remains. The expertise required for drug
allergies or interactions is still a critical component of the profession. Interesting to
note in this debate is that the word science is within the word conscience.

